International market power in oil and strategic responses to climate policy by Aljihrish, Khalid
INTERNATIONAL MARKET POWER IN




c© Copyright by Khalid Aljihrish, 2015
All Rights Reserved
A thesis submitted to the Faculty and the Board of Trustees of the Colorado School
of Mines in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy











Dr. Michael R. Walls
Professor and Division Director
Division of Economics and Business
ii
ABSTRACT
Effective sub-global initiatives to limit carbon emissions will result in substantial changes
in the international demand for fossil energy, and this transfers policy costs to energy ex-
porters. Most quantitative analysis of carbon policy, however, does not consider Saudi
Arabia’s significant market power in crude oil. The literature largely ignores the fact that
Saudi Arabia might change export markups in a way that mitigates the climate policy costs.
Against this background, this dissertation addresses three primary concerns. First, under
what conditions does Saudi Arabia have the ability to respond to oil demand shocks. Second,
what are the impacts of a sub-global climate policy on regional welfare and carbon leakage
levels and what are the effects of a Saudi strategic reaction on those levels. Third, to what
extent can the climate coalition retaliate to Saudi Arabia’s reaction and what are the results
of this game between the coalition and Saudi Arabia on welfare and carbon leakage. We
adopt a global numeric model based on GTAP data but modify it to consider the benchmark
divergence between the marginal cost of producing crude oil in Saudi Arabia and the world
price of crude oil. Under this consideration, we find that Saudi Arabia has ample scope for
a strategic reaction to external climate policies. We find that Saudi Arabia’s reaction sig-
nificantly alters relative prices of fossil fuels and therefore the regional share of the climate
policy burden. Increasing the relative price of oil, as a result of Saudi Arabia’s strategic
reaction, reduces consumption of oil globally and drives large reductions in carbon leakage.
This comes at the expense of reductions in oil importers welfare, which a large portion of the
coalition falls under. The coalition has market power on the oil import side and therefore
has the incentive to retaliate to Saudi Arabia’s reaction. We find historical evidence for
an agreement between Saudi Arabia and the West, particularly the US, that answers the
question of why the coalition and Saudi Arabia do not exercise their respective oil market
power in the benchmark data. The dissolution of this agreement as a result of the coalition
iii
taking action on climate change creates the incentive for both parties, the coalition and
Saudi Arabia, to exploit their oil market power. This break-down of the agreement leads to
reduced welfare levels for both parties and increased carbon leakage.
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The Conference of the Parties, COP, to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, UNFCCC, has convened 19 times to move forward mitigation strategies
to combat the global climate effects of greenhouse gas emissions. At such rate, a workable
sub-global agreement to limit the consumption and production of fossil fuels, the biggest
emitters of greenhouse gases, seems likely. Throughout the negotiations, Saudi Arabia has
been hostile to any form of agreement it deemed detrimental to its economy. Saudi Arabia,
leading other OPEC countries, has consistently blocked and failed to ratify any possible
agreement by the COP (Depledge, 2008)1. Saudi Arabias anxiety over the possibility of a
global climate agreement and its implications on the country is understandable. By latest
estimates, oil accounts for nearly 90 percent of fiscal revenues and nearly 88 percent of exports
(Alshahrani & Alsadiq, 2014). Saudi Arabia has not publicly disclosed any estimates of the
possible impact on the economy of the proposed policies nor has it divulged what would be
its strategic reaction to such policies. Saudi Arabia’s position as a dominant oil producer
gives it a strong incentive to exercise its market power and respond strategically to global
climate policies in an effort to mitigate the negative impacts those policies may have on its
economy.
The literature has largely ignored two features that we include in this thesis. First, most
studies concerned with the design and impacts of climate policies ignore the dominant role
Saudi Arabia plays in the international crude oil market. Most models assume a competitive
international crude oil market where producers take prices as given and produce at price
equals marginal cost. Crude oil is not sold at marginal cost across regions, and the marginal
cost of production differs greatly across regions. The second feature we include in our model
1See also Saudi Arabia’s communication reports to the UFCCC
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is the ability of Saudi Arabia to leverage its market power in reaction to exogenous climate
policies.
Assuming price taking behavior is a fair assumption to make in the case of oil producing
countries that have no market power which is the case for most oil producing countries. Most
of these countries produce at capacity and rely on Saudi Arabia to compensate global supply
shortages. Saudi Arabia’s influence over the global oil market is reflected in the absolute cost
advantage it has over most oil producing countries around the world, its massive production
capacity, and its ability to ramp up production at will (Nakov & Nuno, 2013). Saudi Arabia’s
marginal cost of producing a barrel of oil is estimated at five US dollars, a fraction of the
prevailing oil prices in the last decade (Al-Qahtani, 2008). On average it produces 10 percent
of global oil production and it maintains a surplus capacity of 2-4 percent of global oil supply.
All of this gives Saudi Arabia a distinct advantage over all other oil producing countries and
gives it the ability to significantly influence the global oil markets.
The dominant role Saudi Arabia plays has been examined in numerous papers that are
concerned with the nature and behavior of players in the international crude oil market
(Adelman, 1982; Alhajji & Huettner, 2000b; Erickson, 1980; Mabro, 1975; Spilimbergo, 2001)
2. A large portion of the literature on the structure and type of behavior in the crude oil
markets points to the dominant role Saudi Arabia plays in this market. One of the most
comprehensive analyses on this was done by Alhajji & Huettner (2000a) where the market
was studied for the period between 1973 and 1994 for three possible market structures:
competitive, Cournot oligopoly, and dominant firm. The study shows that OPEC and the
OPEC core3 do not fit neatly into one of the market assumptions indicated above. They
arrive at the conclusion that Saudi Arabia is the dominant player within OPEC and they
list several reasons supporting their results. Some of these reasons are: Saudi Arabia is the
only producer that maintains spare capacity while the others always produce at capacity,
2For a comprehensive review of the literature on oil market modeling see Literature Review on Oil Market
Modeling and OPEC’s Behavior (2008) by Al-Qahtani et al.
3the OPEC core includes Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Libya, and Qatar.
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Saudi Arabia is the only country that consistently reduces its supply willingly to maintain
prices, Saudi Arabia’s production is negatively correlated with the rest of the players within
OPEC, and Saudi Arabia is the only player that has a history of mothballing production
facilities.
By virtue of Saudi Arabia having a dominant role in the oil markets in our model, it
has an ability to influence oil prices if it needs to. In this thesis I argue that Saudi Arabia
indeed has the ability to influence international oil prices to maintain optimal welfare levels
at home. This is another feature of our model that is different from the majority of the
numerical literature on climate policy. The literature has largely ignored the possible effects
of such retaliatory reaction on the prevailing global equilibrium under sub-global climate
policy. In most numeric simulation models, Saudi Arabia and other crude oil exporting
countries are assumed to behave competitively. They are assumed not to react strategically
to climate policy while demand for their most valuable export, crude oil, is decreased due to
the policy. Numerous papers (e.g., Bernstein et al. (1999); Bohringer et al. (1998b); Fischer
& Fox (2012); McKibben & Wilcoxen (2002)) have looked at the regional and sectoral effects
of global and sub-global climate treaties, most famously Kyoto, while giving minimum regard
to the impact dominant fossil fuel exporters could have on the results of those policies. Most
papers outline the negative effects on welfare by the application of climate policies on oil
exporting countries but do not explicitly examine the possible strategic reactions of those
countries.
A few papers have considered the possible reaction of OPEC as a cartel to sub-global
climate policies but use different instruments for the reaction than the one we use in our
model. Throughout the thesis we assume Saudi Arabia’s instrument for maintaining optimal
welfare levels at home is the markup it puts on crude oil exports above its marginal cost of
producing oil. This is different than all papers we have come across during our review of
the literature. Berg et al. (1996) use a dynamic numerical model to analyze which group of
oil producers, the cartel (OPEC) or the fringe producers, see the biggest reduction in their
3
wealth under an international tax on carbon emissions. They find that if OPEC acts as a
cartel then it reacts to the policy by reducing its output to maintain prices and therefore see
the most reduction in their wealth. On the other hand if the market reacts competitively
then fringe producers see the most reduction in their wealth. Since they consider a global
carbon tax policy, they do not estimate the effect of the policy on emissions leakage4. They
also do not show the effect of the policy on regional welfare.
Braten & Golombek (1998) model a game between an emission abating coalition and
OPEC in which the goal for each player is to maximize net income given a goal on global
climate emissions. They use a numerical model where they find which player acts as a
leader and which acts as a follower in equilibrium. They find that in equilibrium the abating
coalition chooses to be a leader while OPEC acts as a follower but that the order of the
move is numerically unimportant. They conclude that both players have limited incentives
for strategic behavior. They do not look at the effect of a strategic reaction by OPEC on
global emissions or leakage.
This thesis includes three essays. In Chapter 2, we consider Saudi Arabia’s optimal
reaction to crude oil demand shocks. First, we use a simple theoretic model to show that
Saudi Arabia’s optimal reaction might be to increase or decrease their markup over marginal
cost. We then demonstrate, using a data-driven numerical general-equilibrium model, that
Saudi Arabia’s optimal reaction to a Annex-I crude oil tax is to decrease their markup.
In Chapter 3, we extend the numerical model from Chapter 2 to consider a sub-global
climate policy. We examine Saudi Arabia’s optimal reaction under this realistic carbon
scenario. We look at the effects of a specific Annex-I abatement policy on regional welfare and
carbon leakage under alternative Saudi reactions. In Chapter 4, we consider an alternative
calibration, where Saudi Arabia gains some non-pecuniary benefits through a tacit pact with
the US by keeping international oil prices below what would be optimal under purely a profit
motivation. We look at the results of this pact disintegrating as a result of US participation
4Leakage is defined as the change in CO2 emissions of the non-abating region relative to change CO2 emissions
in the abating region resulting from the application of an emissions policy in the abating region.
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in a sub-global climate coalition and Saudi Arabia’s reaction. We also consider the action
the US might take to retaliate. We end the thesis with the conclusion in the final chapter.
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CHAPTER 2
A DOMINANT OIL PRODUCER’S RESPONSE TO CRUDE OIL DEMAND SHOCKS
Fossil fuels consumption has been a central issue in most climate policy negotiations.
Burning fossil fuels, including crude oil, is the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions.
Limiting the consumption of fossil fuels has been one of the main objectives of climate policy
negotiations. Most economic analysis of the effects of climate policies do not thoroughly
analyze the effect on crude oil prices and consequently the effect on the welfare of crude oil
dependent economies. The welfare of oil exporters is anticipated to worsen as a result of any
global or sub-global climate policy. Saudi Arabia, the largest oil exporter, will presumably
bear the brunt of any reduction in global consumption of crude oil given its dominant role in
the global oil markets. It naturally has an incentive to react to those policies to mitigate the
negative impacts on its economy. To our knowledge, the effects on Saudi Arabia’s welfare
and the possible reaction it might take is missing from the literature on the economic effects
of climate policy.
In this paper we first introduce a simple partial equilibrium model to analyze the change
in Saudi Arabia’s optimal markup on crude exports under an exogenous shock to the demand
for its oil exports. We show that the change in optimal Saudi markup could be either negative
or positive depending on the parameterization. In the second part we introduce a data-driven
general equilibrium model. We establish a conjectural calibration under which we adjust the
parameterization so that Saudi Arabia’s observed markup is optimal. We then introduce
an exogenous policy that taxes consumption of crude oil in a large sub-global coalition. We
analyze if Saudi Arabia has the ability to mitigate some negative effects on its welfare under
the policy by changing its markup and the results of that on regional welfare and global
carbon emissions. We focus on a simple policy that targets oil consumption in Annex-I
countries. We do this to examine the direct effects of the demand shock on Saudi and its
6
ability to retaliate without muddling our analysis with the complexities introduced by an
emissions policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2.1 we present an illustra-
tive partial equilibrium model to show how a dominant player’s markup changes in response
to demand shocks. In Section 2.2 we present a numerical general equilibrium model and the
policy counterfactual we use to apply the findings from Section 2.1. In Section 2.4 we outline
the impacts of the policy on Saudi Arabia and analyze its scope for a strategic reaction. We
provide concluding remarks in Section 2.5.
2.1 A Partial Equilibrium Illustrations of Potential Reactions
We use a simple partial equilibrium model to show the ambiguity of changes in optimal
markup levels for a dominant producer. The model is a system of linear supply and demand
functions. We simplify the formulation by assuming the dominant producer is a monopolist.
The dominant producer’s reaction is identical to a monopolist albeit on the residual demand
curve instead of the total demand curve. Let total market demand be denoted by Q and the
market price by P . We describe the linear inverse-demand function, P (Q), with parameters
α (the intercept) and β (the slope):
P (Q) = α− βQ (2.1)
We assume a linear marginal cost function for the monopolist, c(Q), with intercept a and
slope b. Thus c is defined as follows:
c(Q) = a+ bQ. (2.2)
Let the demand elasticity be defined as follows:



















By substituting ε out we get the following condition:
c = 2P − α, (2.6)
which embeds the optimizing behavior. Now by substituting the inverse demand into c we







Equations (2.6) and (2.7) can be solved for the solution price, P, and marginal cost, c, that
would be consistent with the benchmark equilibrium:
P ∗ =







Using the solution price and cost we can now consider the impact of a demand shock on
the equilibrium markup. Let the demand shock take the form of a change in α. Differenti-


























Inserting (2.10) and (2.11) into (2.13) and solving for the critical value of b where dz
dα
= 0





If b is set below b̃ then dz
dα
< 0, and if b is set above b̃ then dz
dα
> 0. Conditional on the
initial calibrated markup and the relationship between b and β we get that the markup
may go up or down when demand is shocked. At steep enough marginal cost curve slopes
(high b), demand shocks drive a larger change in the marginal cost than the change in price
which leads to a higher markup as a result of demand reduction. This is the case when the
monopolist is operating close to its capacity constraint if we are considering a more realistic
constant elasticity marginal cost curve. On the flatter side of the MC schedule we get the
more expected result of lower markups as demand is shocked negatively. (2.14) also shows
that at higher demand slopes, β, the monopolist’s optimal markup is reduced in the presence
of negative demand shocks. Included in Appendix C is a simple GAMS model that illustrates
the operation of this analytic model.
If the fringe’s supply is included in this model, the demand curve faced by the dominant
producer will change. The above result still holds since changes in the markup are determined
by the value of the slope of the dominant producer’s marginal cost curve relative to the




The data for the model are based on the GTAP 8 database. The database is a represen-
tation of detailed national accounts of production, consumption, and emissions in 57 sectors
and bilateral trade flows between 129 regions based on data for the year 2007 (Narayanan
et al., 2012). The parameters of the functional forms are determined to represent the opti-
mizing behavior of the agents in the model and to also reflect the data in the base year. Sub-
stitution elasticities in the model are largely based on the estimates in the GTAP database.
The exception was the elasticity of substitution between energy goods in the consumption
block and the Argmington elasticities. Consistent with Bohringer & Rutheford (2001), these
elasticities were adjusted lower to reflect the agents’ minimal ability to substitute between
energy goods. Armington subsitution elasticities were also constrained to lower levels since
the estimates in the GTAP database were too high.
The baseline equilibrium is set to the GTAP data. This is used as a benchmark against
which we compare the equilibrium that emerges under the tax policy. The data in the
GTAP database is aggregated to allow us to focus our analysis on the regions and sectors
that are most likely to be influenced by the policy. The 57 sectors in the original database
are aggregated to 13 sectors that include all energy sectors (coal, crude, natural gas, re-
fined petroluem products, and electricity) and eight energy intensive sectors (air transport,
mining, non-metalic minerals, non-ferrous metals, machinery, transport, steel industry, and
petrochemicals). The remaining 44 sectors are aggregated into one sector labeled “All Other
Goods”. At the regional level, we aggregate the original 129 regions included in the model to
17 regions reflecting the major crude oil producing and importing regions in the world. Ta-
ble 2.1 lists the aggregated sectors, regions, and factors derived from the GTAP 8 database5.
The model builds on Bohringer & Rutheford (2001) multi-sector multi-region calibrated
numeric simulation model. The model is a representation of the general equilibrium structure
5Table A.1, Table A.2, and Table A.3 in Appendix A show detailed mapping of the regions, sectors, and
factors in this model.
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Table 2.1: Aggregated Sectors and Regions in the Model
SECTORS
Energy Coal, Crude Oil, Natural Gas, Refined Petroleum Products,
Electricity
Energy Intensive Air Transport, Mining, Non-Metalic Minerals, Non-Ferrous Met-
als, Machinery
Transport, Steel Industry, Petrochemicals
Other All Other Goods
REGIONS
Non-Coalition OPEC (Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates, Venezuela), Russia, China, India, Mexico, ROW
Coalition Annex-I countries with USA, Norway, Canada, Australia included
as separate regions
FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
Capital, Labor (skilled and unskilled), Natural Resources
formalized by Arrow & Debreu (1954). We represent the economy as a set of equilibrium
conditions following the tradition of Shoven & Whalley (1992). A representative agent in
each region receives income from three primary factors: labor, capital, and natural resources.
The representative agent takes prices as given and maximizes utility subject to budget con-
straints. Production is carried out by combining primary factors and intermediate inputs
while minimizing cost subject to technology constraints.
Table 2.2 defines the key elasticities we use in our model and provides ranges used for
each elasticity. The elasticites used in the model are based on the GTAP8 database, except
where we explicitly state otherwise.
Production of non-primary fuels is captured in the model by nested constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) cost functions that combine natural resources, capital, labor, energy
and materials.Figure 2.1 shows the nesting of the non-energy sectors. At the bottom level of
the energy nest, coal and gas are combined to form a coal-gas composite. This composite is
combined with other energy products (refined oil, crude, and electricity) to form the energy
11
Table 2.2: Key Elasticities Used in The Model
Parameter Definition Range
σKLEM R CES between capital, labor, energy, materials composite and resources 0.01-5.60
σKLEM CES between capital, labor, energy, and materials 0.00
σKLE CES between capital, labor, and energy 0.20-1.68
σE CES between energy inputs 0.01-5.60
σKL CES between capital and labor 0.20-1.68
σGC CES between coal and gas 2.00
σKLM E CES between capital, labor, and materials composite and energy 0.00
σKLM CES between capital, labor, and materials 0.00
σNE CES between non-energy goods in consumption 1.00
σE C CES between energy goods in consumption 0.25
σD M CES between imports and domestic variety 0.89-5.0
σM CES between imports 1.80-10.0
input composite. The energy composite is combined with a composite of capital and labor,
referred to in the Figure 2.1 as KLE. The KLE composite is then combined with materials to
form the KLEM composite. Finally, KLEM is combined with resources to produce the final
product. This nested structure represents the production of goods in the economy except
primary fuels, electricity, and oil refining (which are described below).
Primary fuels (crude, natural gas, and coal) are represented by a three-level nested pro-
duction function.Figure 2.2 shows the nesting structure for primary fuels production. At
the bottom level capital and labor are combined to form the KL composite. This composite
is combined with materials to form the KLM nest (non-energy nest). At the top level the
KLM nest is combined with the energy nest which is represented similarly to the energy
nest in the production in non-primary fuels sectors (combining refined oil, crude, electricity,
and a composite of coal and gas). The electricity and refined oil sectors use the same nest-
ing as the primary fuels nesting except resources are not inputs to production in these two
sectors.Figure 2.3 shows the nesting structure for the electricity and refined oil sectors.
Final demand is represented in the model by two agents, households and government.
Households maximize their welfare by spending their total income (factor income minus
tax payments) on the consumption of a bundle of energy goods combined with an aggre-
gate of other consumption goods. Figure 2.4 shows the nesting for household consumption.
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Figure 2.1: Nesting Structure for Non-energy Sectors
Energy Inputs Non Energy (Capital, Labor and Materials) 
Materials Capital - Labor 
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Figure 2.2: Nesting Structure for Primary Fuel Sectors
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Figure 2.3: Nesting Structure for Electricity and Refined Oil Sectors
Government generates its income through collecting taxes and resource rents and spends
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Figure 2.4: Nesting of Agent’s Consumption
it on the provision of public goods and services. The size of government is held fixed in
the model using a constraint that varies the tax collected from households as the rent on
resources changes. Goods and services on the international market are traded according to
14
Armington where they are distinguished by place of production (Armington, 1969). Domes-
tic and foreign varieties are not perfect substitutes in the model so each region demands a
bundle of domestic and foreign goods. The exception to this in our model is crude oil which
is treated as a homogeneous good. This is consistent with Balistreri et al. (2010) where
they find the elasticity of subsitution between different grades of crude oil, originating from
multiple regions, is high. Figure 2.5 shows demand for imports and domestic goods.




Figure 2.5: Nesting of Armington Composite
In this paper, we examine the implications of a selected external policy, a 20 percent
tax on crude in Annex-I countries except Russia, on the welfare of Saudi Arabia and the
response strategies that Saudi Arabia might adopt. We depart from the assumption of a
competitive international crude market in the model, where crude was assumed to sell on the
international market for a price equal to marginal cost across all regions. We thus account
for Saudi Arabia’s crude production cost and capacity advantage. We modified the GTAP
data to drive a wedge between the marginal cost of producing Saudi crude and the prevailing
international price for crude oil. The marginal cost of producing crude in Saudi Arabia was
set at 10 percent of the international price of crude oil. The modification reflects data for
Saudi crude production and the average international price of crude in 2007 (the benchmark
year for the GTAP data).
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Saudi Arabia’s response to the policy depends on its ability to increase the markup on
its crude exports given the divergence it enjoys between its marginal cost of production and
the international price of oil. We calibrate the model to test for scenarios under which Saudi
Arabia might react by assuming that the benchmark markup on its crude exports is optimal.
We assume that Saudi Arabia acts as a rational agent in the benchmark by selecting a markup
level on its crude oil exports that maximizes its welfare. We adopt what we think is a realistic
estimation of crude supply elasticities in Saudi Arabia and other crude exporting countries.
In the short run, only spare production capacity is important in determining a country’s
ability to adjust its crude supplies in response to price fluctuations. Historically, short term
crude supply has been extremely inelastic, close to zero, except for countries with spare
production capacity (Krichene, 2002). Saudi Arabia has historically kept 1.5 to 2 million
barrels per day of spare production capacity ready to be deployed as demand rises, giving
it a distinct advantage among other crude exporting countries in influencing international
crude prices (IEA, 2007). Saudi Arabia’s dominance in the oil market is further enhanced by
the inelastic nature of the global crude oil demand. Short and long term crude oil demand
elasticities have been estimated in the econometric literature to hover between zero in the
short run to a high of 0.6 in the long run (Cooper, 2003; Dahl, 2008; Hamilton, 2008).
We assume that Saudi Arabia’s marginal cost is 10 percent of the international price
of crude and that Saudi Arabia is acting rationally where it chooses a markup level that
maximizes its objective, in this case domestic welfare. It follows then that the international
crude price in the benchmark is the optimal price for Saudi Arabian welfare. Assuming
10 percent marginal cost yields a markup of 900 percent in the benchmark, using equation
2.15 above. We calibrate the marginal cost curve elasticity for Saudi Arabia and the supply
elasticity of other OPEC producers so that Saudi Arabia’s welfare is at an optimum in
the benchmark. To maintain tractability we model the fringe as competitive with inelastic
responses. Consistent with the behavior of Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members, we
assume that Saudi Arabia’s elasticity of the marginal cost curve is high while the elasticity
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of supply for other crude producers is low. Historical production data show that Saudi
Arabia has always taken proportionally larger production cuts than other OPEC members
in response to negative oil price shocks and has kept proportionally larger spare capacity
than the rest of OPEC (Nakov & Nuno, 2013). We iteratively arrive at a set of crude supply
elasticities for Saudi Arabia and the rest of the crude oil exporters that renders the markup
on Saudi oil exports in the benchmark optimal. The crude supply elasticities in this scenario
are ηsau = 15 and ηopec = 0.05 for Saudi Arabia and the rest of OPEC, respectively, reflecting
Saudi Arabia’s ability to ramp up production at will and the inelastic supply of other crude
producing countries. All other oil producing countries are assigned a supply elasticity of zero.
This is consistent with the evidence that the fringe does not decrease supply in response to
negative demand shocks. Anderson et al. (2014) show evidence that production from existing
oil wells in competitive producers, in their case Texas, is not affected by negative price shocks.
Under these assumptions, Saudi Arabia’s welfare is optimal when the markup on its crude
exports is 900 percent. We find that OPEC’s supply elasticity has a significant effect on
Saudi Arabia’s ability to markup its crude exports. As OPEC’s supply elasticity increases,
Saudi Arabia’s ability to markup its crude exports diminishes.
Figure 2.6 shows the change in Saudi welfare in our benchmark model under different
calibration conjectures of the supply and marginal cost curve elasticities for OPEC and
Saudi. Choosing ηsau = 15 and ηopec = 0.05 generates the desired benchmark equilibrium
consistent with our conjecture of optimal Saudi markups.
2.3 Policy Experiment
The policy experiment considers a 20 percent tax on crude consumption in Annex-I
countries. The focus of this paper is not the mechanism, efficiency, or plausibility, of a
consensus by Annex-I countries on a policy to combat climate change. The focus is on a
clean experiment that allows us to consider the strategic response of Saudi Arabia to external
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Figure 2.6: Changes in Saudi welfare as a function of its markup on crude exports
be significant enough to drop the Annex-I countries’ emissions levels to five percentage points
below 1990 levels, the target of the Kyoto protocol6(kyo, 1998). Annex-I countries were
chosen given the quantity of crude they import relative to the size of the international crude
market and the likely impact a policy curbing crude demand in those countries would have
on international crude prices. Table 2.3 shows the value of crude demand and supply of all
regions included in the model. The data shows Annex-I countries consumed approximately
41 percent of the global crude supply in 2007. Any action by Annex-I countries to curb
emissions, and the likely resulting negative impact on their crude demand, will affect prices in
the international crude market. The data also shows the dominant position Saudi Arabia has
in the supply of crude to the international markets where it supplied 13 percent of the crude
traded in 2007. Saudi Arabia’s exposure to international crude price swings is exacerbated
by the large share crude oil revenues represent out of total government revenues, 87 percent
in 2007 (Mitchell & Schmidt, 2008).
6Table B.1 shows CO2 emissions levels in all Annex-I countries in the reference year 1990, and the emissions
for the year 2007, which we based our model on
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Table 2.3: Value of Crude Demand and Supply across all Regions in the Model
Value of Value of












Saudi Arabia 45.09 224.85
United Arab Emirates 6.97 60.07
USA 409.14 137.02
Venezuela 18.44 50.45
Rest of Annex-I Countries 439.18 80.83
Rest of World 368.05 457.31
* Value measured in billions of US dollars, 2007
2.4 Results
Figure 2.7 shows the impact of the crude tax on the welfare of Saudi Arabia. Welfare drops
by 13.9 percent if Saudi Arabia maintains the 900 percent markup. The impact on welfare is the
Hicksian equivalent variation in income relative to pre-policy levels.
Global demand for crude oil drops by $12.3 billion, or equivalently by 17.1 million barrels of
global demand if we used the assumed price of $72 per barrel in 2007. International price of crude
drops by 3.7 percent. This is primarily the reason for the significant drop in Saudi welfare. Saudi
Arabia is able to mitigate some of the negative impacts on its welfare by reducing the markup on its
crude exports to 875 percent. Decreasing the markup results in an improvement of approximately
0.1 percent to Saudi welfare relative to the condition under which Saudi maintains its benchmark
markup of 900 percent. Given the crude oil market power we assign to Saudi in this model, any
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Figure 2.7: Impact on Saudi Arabia’s welfare under Annex-I crude tax policy
Arabia’s instrument for reducing the markup is through increasing its own oil production to lower
the international price of crude oil. Reducing the markup results in a decrease in the international
price of crude by 5 percent relative to the benchmark price of crude. This in turn results in an
increase in global demand for crude oil by 0.3 percent relative to the scenario where Saudi Arabia
does not react. Figure 2.8 shows the drop in global demand for crude, Saudi Arabia’s crude oil
production, and the change in the international price of crude under no strategic reaction by Saudi
and then under a strategic reaction by Saudi. To ensure our results are consistent with the analytic
model in (2.2) we estimate the point demand elasticity for Saudi Arabia’s oil at the new equilibrium
under the policy and compare that with the benchmark elasticity. The point demand elasticity local
to our calibration in the benchmark is -2.36 while the point elasticity local to the new equilibrium
point under the policy is -2.44. The increase in the elasticity results in diminished ability for Saudi
Arabia to markup its crude exports. Relative prices of other energy goods decrease since oil is
the only energy commodity that is taxed. Therefore consumers are able to substitute to other
energy goods which results in an increase in the elasticity of their demand for oil. These results,
however, are dependent on the assumed functional forms and the local calibration we assume in
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the benchmark. Different functional forms might result in different general-equilibrium effects once
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Figure 2.8: Change in global demand of crude, Saudi oil production, and the international
price of crude under the Annex-I policy and then under the strategic reaction by Saudi
The tax policy and the the subsequent reduction in the markup has an effect on the welfare of
other regions. There are welfare losses across all regions as a result of the tax on crude consumption
in Annex-I countries. The most pronounced effects are in countries where crude oil represents a large
share of the country’s exports. Their misery is exacerbated as Saudi Arabia re-optimizes its markup
resulting in lower international prices for crude. Oil exporters are inflicted twice; first through the
reduction in global oil prices as a result of the crude consumption tax in Annex-I countries and
then through Saudi Arabia’s reaction which decreases oil prices further. Figure 2.9 shows the
impacts on the various regions considered in the model after the policy in Annex-I countries is
applied under the scenarios of a non-strategic reaction by Saudi and a strategic reaction by Saudi,
namely under the condition where Saudi’s markup is 900 percent and under the condition where
that markup is reduced to 875 percent. The impacts on Annex-I oil exporters is exacerbated by the
crude consumption tax in those regions as well. The tax reduces welfare in all Annex-I countries,
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albeit to a varying degree depending on the size of crude consumption relative to the rest of the
economy. Annex-I oil importers are made worse by the tax policy but their welfare is improved
slightly by the Saudi reaction. Global welfare drops by 0.32 percent after the policy is applied
in Annex-I countries. It is improved slightly by the reduction in oil prices resulting from Saudi











































Figure 2.9: Welfare impacts on select regions in the model benchmark and re-optimized
markup
As expected, crude oil demand in the countries that applied taxes on crude consumption drops
significantly by roughly 8.5 percent while demand in the rest of the world increased by 7.8 percent.
Global crude demand decreased by 0.7 percent with no Saudi reaction and by 0.4 percent, relative
to the benchmark, under a Saudi strategic reaction. Table 2.4 shows the change in crude demand
in the various regions included in the model. The level of the drop depends on the country’s sectors
and consumers ability to substitute away from crude oil to other fuels. Crude oil demand in other
countries that did not apply the policy, including Saudi Arabia, increased significantly. Large oil
producers, e.g. the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, saw a substantial increase in their crude
oil demand. The distributional effects of the policy is most pronounced in those countries. Crude
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oil demand increases also, albeit at lower levels than those seen in large oil producers, in large
economies like China and India. This effect lessens the impacts on the demand for Saudi crude and
as a result reduces the negative effects on its welfare. Had the crude tax policy been coupled with
other policies that limit the leakage effect, e.g. border tax adjustments, then the severity of the
impact on Saudi welfare would have been larger.
Table 2.4: Regional crude oil consumption resulting from Annex-I tax policy
Benchmark Policy Saudi
Reaction
ARE 7 8 8
AUS 16 15 15
AXI 439 396 397
CAN 39 44 44
CHN 154 159 160
IND 76 80 80
IRN 38 39 39
KWT 21 24 24
MEX 20 22 22
NGA 1 1 1
NOR 8 9 9
QAT 3 4 4
ROW 368 397 398
RUS 95 107 108
SAU 45 48 47
USA 409 371 372
VEN 18 22 22
Total 1755 1745 1750
The impacts on carbon leakage of the Annex-I policy and the subsequent reaction by Saudi are
shown in Figure 2.10. Even though we do not consider a policy in this chapter that directly targets
CO2 emissions we still wanted to examine the effectiveness of the policy we consider on carbon
emissions against other policies considered in subsequent chapters. As we can see in Figure 2.10,
CO2 leakage can be significant under a policy that targets crude oil consumption in a large regional
coalition. Total leakage resulting from a tax on crude consumption in Annex-I countries and
no strategic reaction from Saudi Arabia is 38.5 percent. This is significantly more than what
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is common in the literature under climate policies that directly target emissions (Bernstein et al.,
1999; Bohringer et al., 1998b). Leakage increases to 50.2 percent as Saudi Arabia reacts by reducing
its markup. This is the result of increased consumption of crude oil in regions not subject to the

































Figure 2.10: Carbon leakage by region under benchmark markup and re-optimized markup
by Saudi Arabia
In Table 2.5 we include the impacts on welfare and leakage if we assume a competitive oil market
and compare that with the results we get from our model with the assumption of Saudi market
power. As we can see from the table, the divergence between the local price of oil in Saudi and the
international price of crude has an effect on the prevailing equilibrium under an external tax on
crude. Both welfare and carbon leakage are significantly different than results in a model assuming
a competitive oil market. This can be explained by the the higher oil price that emerges under an
assumption of dominant behavior by Saudi Arabia, where global welfare is made worse while there
is less carbon leakage, compared to the international price of crude oil that would emerge under an
assumption of a competitive oil market. Saudi reaction, or re-optimization of its markup, drives
oil prices lower making global welfare slightly better and carbon leakage significantly worse than if
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they maintain the benchmark markup.
Table 2.5: Summary of global welfare and carbon leakage changes under competitive and a
Saudi market power assumptions
Competitive Oil Market Saudi Cost Advantage
Benchmark Re-Optimize
Global Welfare -0.25 -0.32 -0.31
Global Leakage 43.19 38.51 50.22
2.5 Conclusion
The role of energy exporters in the outcome of sub-global climate initiatives has been largely
ignored in most economic analysis of the subject. An underlying assumption in most analysis of
climate policy is that oil exporters behave competitively in response to any policy that imposes
harm on their economies. In our analysis we show that Saudi Arabia, the largest oil producer
and exporter, under certain conditions has the ability to significantly alter the regional and sec-
toral equilibrium under a tax on crude consumption in a large sub-global coalition. We find that
Saudi Arabia has the ability to improve its welfare by increasing its production and lowering the
international price of crude oil. Also, the effects on carbon leakage are significant under a policy
that targets crude oil consumption and not emissions directly. Based on comparisons with other
papers that consider policies that limit emissions by capping or taxing emissions directly, we find
that a policy that targets crude oil consumption results in larger carbon leakage levels. This is a
consideration that policy makers in coalitions that strive to limit emissions should take into account
when comparing climate policy alternatives. The policy lesson for oil exporters, specifically Saudi
Arabia, is to consider the effect on their economies of a retaliation that the abating coalition could
attempt to reduce the leakage resulting from its reaction and weigh that against the benefits of its
strategic reaction.
A natural extension to this paper is to consider a carbon emissions policy instead of a policy
targeting crude oil consumption. We used oil consumption as a policy target to be able to directly
measure the effect on Saudi Arabia in a worst case scenario and not have the results muddled by
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the substitution effects between fossil fuels due to the differences in carbon intensity of the various
fuels. Another possible extension to our analysis is to consider the market power that the coalition
has on the demand side and analyzing what would be the equilibrium if they, and not just Saudi
Arabia, exercise their power in the oil market.
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CHAPTER 3
SAUDI ARABIA’S POTENTIAL ROLE IN MITIGATING THE CARBON LEAKAGE
PROBLEM
CO2 leakage resulting from unilateral climate policy initiatives is a major concern. Leakage
occurs through two main channels: the competitive channel; and the fossil fuel price channel.
Through the competitive channel sub-global climate policies increase the cost of inputs of energy
for energy-intensive producers in the abating region. This encourages more production of those
goods in other regions since goods in the abating region are less competitive. Through the fossil
fuel price channel, decreased demand for the fuels in the abating region depresses their global prices,
especially if the abating coalition is large. This has a positive effect on the consumption of those
fuels in non-abating regions driving an increase in carbon emissions.
The impact of sub-global climate policy initiatives on regional welfare and CO2 leakage has
been analyzed in numerous papers. Bohringer & Rutheford (2001); Bohringer et al. (1998a,b);
Mattoo et al. (2009), and Fischer & Fox (2012) all analyze the effects of climate policy initiatives
on CO2 leakage and the effectiveness of the various border measures on combating leakage. A
comprehensive study was done by Bohringer et al. (2012) to determine the role of border measures
in reducing the impact of leakage. They use the results from 12 expert group models to determine
leakage rates under a given sub-global climate policy and the effectiveness of border measures.
Using those models, leakage rates are estimated in the range of 5 - 20 percent. Leakage due to the
fossil fuels price channel accounts for most of the leakage. They found that on average across models
80 percent of leakage is eliminated if fossil fuel prices are returned to their pre-policy levels. Most
papers in this field of research assume a competitive international oil market and ignore empirical
evidence on the international oil market structure that shows producers’ behavior contrary to that
assumption7. This is important because strategic responses can have a significant impact on global
oil prices and the resulting leakage through the fossil fuel price channel. We calibrate the model
7See Adelman (1982, 1993); Alhajji & Huettner (2000a); Johany (1980); Mabro (1975) for evidence on the
non-competitive behavior of players in the international market for crude oil.
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in this paper to reflect Saudi Arabia’s oil market power and also consider Saudi Arabia’s ability to
strategically react to climate policies by varying the markup on its crude exports.
In this paper we are specifically interested in the behavior of a major oil exporter, Saudi
Arabia, under climate policy. The behavior of oil producers as a block, most commonly OPEC,
under climate policy has been examined in the literature before but not that of Saudi Arabia. Some
papers have looked at the interaction between oil exporters, particularly OPEC, and the climate
policy coalition to analyze the incidence of the policy on the abating region and oil exporters.
Braten & Golombek (1998) set up a game between a CO2 abating region and OPEC where they
examine the strategic behavior of both players, OPEC and the abating coalition, and the results
of that behavior on the welfare in both regions. Rubio & Escriche (2001) in a dynamic model
analyze the interaction between a resource exporting cartel and a coalition of resource importers.
They analyze under what conditions a climate tax would allow the coalition to seize some of the
cartel’s profits. Berg et al. (1996) use a dynamic numerical model to analyze which group of oil
producers, the cartel (OPEC) or the fringe producers, see the biggest reduction in their wealth
under an international tax on carbon emissions. The objective for OPEC in their paper is to
maximize profits, not welfare. They find that if OPEC acts as a cartel then it reacts to the policy
by reducing its output by a larger proportion than if it acted competitively. Therefore in this case
OPEC sees larger reductions in their wealth than the fringe. On the other hand if OPEC reacts
competitively then the fringe producers see the most proportional reduction in their wealth. They
do not show what happens to emissions leakage or regional welfare under each assumption about
OPEC’s behavior.
These papers, however, do not quantify the effect of a strategic reaction by resource exporters
on welfare and CO2 leakage. We examine the effects of a strategic reaction to climate policy by a
dominant oil player, Saudi Arabia, on CO2 leakage and welfare in the abating and the non-abating
regions. We chose Saudi as the dominant exporter in this case, and not OPEC, based on the
evidence that Saudi Arabia has been largely the dominant player in OPEC and usually is the only
player to react to changes in the supply and demand of oil on the international market. We also
argue that it easier and more feasible for Saudi to act unilaterally rather than collude with other
oil exporters to achieve improvements to its own welfare. Our analysis show that there is ample
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scope for Saudi to react to sub-global climate policy initiatives, mitigating some of the impacts on
its welfare and in the process reducing CO2 leakage through an increase in the international price
of oil.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 3.1 and 3.2 we present the
numerical general equilibrium model and the policy experiments we use in our analysis. In Section
3.3 we outline the impacts on regional welfare and CO2 leakage under the policy and compared
them to the results from Chapter 2. We also outline the results under a strategic reaction by Saudi
Arabia. In Section 3.4 we analyze the sensitivity of our findings to some key parameters in the
model. We provide concluding remarks in Section 3.5.
3.1 Model
We build on the model used in Chapter 2. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, we modeled the effects
on Saudi and other regions’ welfare in the presence of a tax on crude oil consumption in Annex-
I countries. We did that to focus on the effects in the international market for crude oil while
establishing the basic theory and our method of calibration. In this chapter we use a more realistic
scenario for climate policy action in Annex-I countries, specifically a cap on CO2 emissions in
Annex-I region. Behavioral responses are more complex but yield a measure of carbon leakage and
welfare under a true climate scenario.
We continue to use the markup on Saudi oil exports as the instrument that Saudi Arabia uses to
react to the climate policy. We model the markup on oil exports as an endogenous export tax added
on the price of crude oil sold domestically, which is set equal to the marginal cost of producing
crude in Saudi Arabia. We assume Saudi Arabia’s marginal cost is 10 percent of the prevailing
average price of crude oil in 2007, which was 72 USD8 while all other oil exporters have a marginal
cost equal to the international price of crude oil. Assuming a marginal cost of 10 percent of the
international price of crude yields a markup of 900 percent for Saudi oil exports. Adopting the
conjectural calibration introduced in Chapter 2, we calibrate the marginal cost curve and supply
elasticities for Saudi Arabia and OPEC to arrive at an optimal benchmark markup for Saudi Arabia
of 900 percent. The elasticity values we choose are reflective of Saudi Arabia’s ability to respond
8Source: The US Energy Information Administration
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to changes in demand levels in the international crude oil market and the observation of other
exporters producing at capacity. The elasticity values we choose are 15 for Saudi Arabia and 0.05
for OPEC, while we assign zero elasticity of supply to all other oil exporters.
As is the case in Chapter 2, production is captured in the model by nested constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) cost functions that combine natural resources, capital, labor, energy and
materials. Figure 3.1 shows the nesting of non-energy sectors production. At the bottom level
of the energy nest, coal and gas are combined to form a coal-gas composite. This composite is
combined with other energy products (refined oil, crude, and electricity) to form the energy input
composite. The energy composite is combined with a composite of capital and labor, referred to in
the Figure 3.1 as KLE. The KLE composite is then combined with materials to form the KLEM
composite. Finally, KLEM is combined with resources to produce the final product. This nested
structure represents the production of all goods in the economy except primary fuels.
Resources 
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Figure 3.1: Nesting Structure for Non-energy Sectors
Primary fuels (crude, natural gas, and coal) are represented by a three-level nested production
function. Figure 3.2 shows the nesting structure for primary fuels production. At the bottom
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level capital and labor are combined to form the KL composite. This composite is combined with
materials to form the KLM nest (non-energy nest). At the top level the KLM nest is combined
with the energy nest which is represented similarly to the energy nest in the production in non-
primary fuels sectors (combining refined oil, crude, electricity, and a composite of coal and gas).
The electricity and refined oil sectors use the same nesting as the primary fuels nesting except
resources are not inputs to production in these two sectors. Figure 3.3 shows the nesting structure
for the electricity and refined oil sectors.
Energy Inputs Non Energy (Capital, Labor and Materials) 
Materials Capital - Labor 
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Figure 3.2: Nesting Structure for Primary Fuel Sectors
Final demand is represented in the model by two agents, households and government. House-
holds maximize their welfare by spending their total income (factor income minus tax payments)
on the consumption of a bundle of energy goods combined with an aggregate of other consump-
tion goods. Figure 3.4 shows the nesting for household consumption. Government generates its
income through collecting taxes and resource rents and spends it on the provision of public goods
and services. The size of government is held fixed in the model using a constraint that varies
the tax collected from households as the rent on resources changes. Goods and services on the
international market are traded according to Armington where they are distinguished by place of
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Figure 3.3: Nesting Structure for Electricity and Refined Oil Sectors
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Figure 3.4: Nesting of Agent’s Consumption
production (Armington, 1969). Domestic and foreign varieties are not perfect substitutes in the
model so each region demands a bundle of domestic and foreign goods. The exception to this in our
model is crude oil which is treated as a homogeneous good. This is consistent with Balistreri et al.
(2010) where they find the elasticity of subsitution between different grades of crude oil, originating
from multiple regions, is high. Figure 4.5 shows demand for imports and domestic goods.
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Figure 3.5: Nesting of Armington Composite
3.2 Policy Experiment
The policy experiment we consider in our model is a 90 percent cap on benchmark CO2 emissions
in Annex-I countries except Russia. CO2 emissions in the benchmark are reflective of the 2005 CO2
data which as a total for Annex I countries, when weighted by size of country level emissions relative
to total Annex-I emissions, is unchanged from 1990 levels9. Kyoto targets called for 10 percent
reduction in total emissions in Annex-I countries in 2012 relative to 1990 levels.
Given the possibility of carbon leakage through the fossil fuel prcice channel or the compet-
itiveness channel, we consider two variations. First we consider that the abating region sets an
exogenous cap on its CO2 emissions at 90 percent of the benchmark ignoring the fact that car-
bon leakage erodes the cap. In the second scenario the level of the cap changes (endogenously)
such that global CO2 emissions are reduced by 10 percent of benchmark Annex-I CO2 emissions,
compensating for leakage.
3.3 Results
We analyze the effects of two different policies on our results: 1. results under an exogenous cap
on CO2 emissions in Annex-I countries, and 2. results under an endogenous cap on CO2 emission
9Table B.1 in appendix C provides detailed accounts of CO2 emissions in the various Annex-I countries in
the years 1990 and 2007.
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in Annex-I countries. We find that there is ample scope for Saudi Arabia to react to the policy
under both scenarios and that the impact on carbon leakage is different under each scenario and
the resulting reaction by Saudi Arabia.
3.3.1 Results Under Exogenous CO2 Emissions Cap
We first consider the impact on Saudi Arabia’s welfare with a fixed cap in Annex-I countries at
90 percent of the benchmark emissions. Figure 3.6 shows the impact on Saudi Arabia’s welfare as
a result of the policy. Impacts on Saudi Arabia’s welfare are significant with a 10 percent drop in
welfare. This is the result of global crude oil demand dropping by $8 billion, or using the assumed
price of $72 USD per barrel for the year 2007 the drop is equivalent to 111 million barrels of reduced
demand. Most of this reduction, 82 million barrels, is borne by Saudi Arabia. Figure 3.7 shows
the change in global crude oil demand and the corresponding drop in Saudi Arabia’s oil production
and the international price of crude. The significant drop in Saudi welfare is explained by the large
share of crude oil in the Saudi economy and by the high supply elasticity of Saudi Arabia’s crude
oil production. Saudi Arabia is able to mitigate some of the negative impacts on its welfare if it
increases the markup on its crude exports by an additional 40 percentage points, making the new
re-optimized markup 940 percent. Saudi Arabia is able to reduce the impacts on its welfare from 10
percent to 9.7 percent, or equivalently by 238 million USD in private consumption. Increasing the
markup increases the international price of crude oil and further reduces global crude oil demand
as shown in Figure 3.7. The impact on welfare of this further drop in global crude demand is,
however, offset by the increased revenues resulting from the higher markup. In essence, the global
response to the climate policy reduces the export-demand elasticity for Saudi oil, which increases
its markup power. These results are more moderate than the results we see in Chapter 2 where
a tax on crude consumption decreases global demand for crude by 50 percent more than the drop
in demand with a cap on emissions. Consequently Saudi welfare does not drop to the same extent
it does in Chapter 2. Consistent with the results of our analytic model in Chapter 2, the impact
of a demand shock on the optimal markup depends on the elasticity of crude demand and on the
elasticity of the marginal cost curve for Saudi Arabia. Contrary to the results in Chapter 2, a
climate policy makes it optimal for Saudi Arabia to increase the markup on its crude exports. A
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reduction in demand driven by a specific consumption tax on crude, the scenario in Chapter 2,
results in an increase in the point elasticity of demand, relative to the benchmark, for Saudi oil
exports. This reduces the ability of Saudi Arabia to markup its exports. On the other hand a
climate policy results in a reduction in the elasticity of demand for Saudi oil exports, which gives
Saudi Arabia a greater ability to markup its exports. This is due to the fact that consumers have
less ability to substitute to other fossil fuels under a climate policy than under an oil tax so their
ability to consume less oil as a result of price changes diminishes as they are forced to use less of
it. We show this by calculating the point elasticity of demand under each scenario and compare
that to the benchmark. We change the international price of oil marginally to find how demand for
Saudi Arabia’s oil exports changes under the consumption tax and the climate policy. Table 3.1
shows these results.




Intl oil price, P 0 1.000 0.953 0.963
Intl oil price, P 1 1.003 0.956 0.966
Saudi oil exports ($Bn), Q0 179.882 171.277 167.859
Saudi oil exports ($Bn), Q1 178.609 170.131 166.581
Elasticity of demand, β -2.359 -2.125 -2.444
We now consider the impacts of the policy on welfare in the abating region and other non-
coalition regions. Welfare from private consumption drops across all regions, albeit at large varia-
tions between all regions. Figure 3.8 shows the impacts on private consumption in various regions
considered in the model. The most significant drop is in Saudi Arabia. Other oil exporting re-
gions (OPEC and Annex-I oil exporting economies) experience significant drops in their private
consumption as well. As in the case with Saudi Arabia, the level of the drop in welfare is related to
the share of crude oil in the overall economy and the elasticity of crude oil supply in each region10.
Annex-I oil importing countries experience a drop in their welfare from private consumption due to
10Table B.2 in appendix C shows the size of crude oil production relative to the size of the economy in each
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Figure 3.7: Change in global crude demand, Saudi crude supply, and international price of
crude under an exogenous CO2 cap in Annex-I
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the cap they implement on their CO2 emissions. Global welfare from private consumption drops by
0.2 percent, a result that is consistent with the results from the EMF 29 (Bohringer et al., 2012).
A result that all regions experience a drop in welfare from private consumption is consistent with
most models in the literature adopting an Armington trade structure for energy intensive goods.
Considering Saudi Arabia’s strategic reaction by increasing its markup on crude exports to 940
percent instead of 900 percent, the impacts on welfare across the various regions are mixed as can
be seen in Figure 3.8. Welfare in oil exporting countries is improved (relative the case with no
Saudi strategic reaction) while welfare in oil importing economies is made worse by the increased
markup on Saudi crude oil exports. Crude oil exporters gain by the increased international price
of crude while crude importers suffer by the same increase in oil prices.
The impacts on welfare in oil exporting countries, particularly Saudi Arabia, are remarkable
especially when compared to the impacts on welfare if we assume a competitive global oil market as
shown in Table 3.2 below. Including Saudi oil market power in the model increases the impact on its
welfare from a 3.5 percent drop in welfare to 10 percent drop in welfare in the case of no emissions
cap. Traditional climate policy models miss the larger impact on Saudi Arabia, an additional 5.26
billion USD loss to Saudi assuming 2007 consumption data. This is due to the assumption in those
models that crude oil sells internationally at a price equivilant to marginal cost across all regions
and relatively inelastic crude supply for all regions. This might explain the fierce opposition that
Saudi, and other oil exporting countries, have towards most climate policy proposals to date unless
those proposals explicitly include compensation schemes to oil exporters to mitigate losses to their
economies.
Under the scenario of no strategic reaction by Saudi Arabia, global emissions and CO2 leakage
are relatively unchanged by the introduction of Saudi Arabia’s oil market power. Total CO2 leakage
in our model is similar to CO2 leakage rates under an assumption of a competitive international
oil market. Table 3.3 shows CO2 leakage under the various assumptions we consider in our model.
Total CO2 leakage is 22.2 percent, not a significant change from leakage under a competitive oil
market assumption which is 22.3 percent. Global oil demand drops by 0.42 percent so oil demand















































Figure 3.8: Impacts on welfare in all regions- exogenous CO2 cap in Annex-I
What makes a difference under Saudi Arabia’s strategic reaction is the increase in its crude
oil exports markup. Figure 3.9 shows that total CO2 leakage drops to 17.9 percent as a result of
Saudi’s increased markup. The drop in CO2 leakage is through two main channels. First, absolute
demand for crude oil, one of the higher CO2 emitting fuels, is decreased due to the increase in
price. Second, the increased crude oil price causes a relative change in the prices of fossil fuels
encouraging switching to less carbon intensive fuels such as natural gas and electricity derived from
natural gas. Consumers are able to switch between a bundle of energy goods (oil, electricity, coal,
and natural gas) with a constant substitution elasticity between the energy goods11. Varying this
elasticity drives large variations in our CO2 leakage results, a point we revisit later in our sensitivity
analysis. When the international price of crude oil increases, the price of refined products (oil in
our model) such as diesel and gasoline go up which encourages switching to other less CO2 intensive
fuels such as natural gas. The reaction by Saudi Arabia to the climate policy has a positive impact
in terms of environmental policy. For Annex-I countries, Saudi Arabia’s response reduces leakage
and the need for measures to combat leakage, while minimally affecting that coalition’s welfare



































Figure 3.9: CO2 Leakage - exogenous CO2 cap in Annex-I
3.3.2 Results Under an Endogenous CO2 Emissions Cap
The emissions cap in Annex-I countries in this scenario is endogenous where global emissions
are reduced by 10 percent of Annex-I benchmark emissions. Because the cap must compensate for
leakage, this further reduces Annex-I countries’ demand for crude oil, and therefore, has a more
severe impact on Saudi Arabia’s welfare. Saudi Arabia’s welfare decreases by 13.8 percent under
the assumption that Saudi does not react strategically. Under the climate policy, Saudi Arabia
reacts strategically by increasing the markup on its crude exports. By increasing its markup an
additional 130 percentage points, Saudi is able to improve its welfare by 2 percentage points, or
equivalently by 1.6 billion USD, compared to the case where the markup is kept at 900 percent.
Figure 3.10 shows the impact on Saudi welfare under the the policy and the change in welfare levels
as Saudi varies its markup on oil exports.
The impact on other regions under the endogenous cap scenario again depends on the share
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Figure 3.10: Impacts of Annex-I carbon policy on Saudi welfare at the benchmark and
re-optimized markup levels - Global CO2 target scenario
by the reduction in global crude demand (see Figure 3.12). Annex-I countries, oil exporters and
importers, undergo larger declines in their welfare reflecting the larger endogenous cap. The rest
of the world witnesses more declines as well under this scenario. This is likely due to the drop in
demand for their exports from other regions, OPEC and Annex-I countries, due to the decline in
those regions’ welfare.
Considering Saudi Arabia’s strategic reaction by increasing its markup on crude exports to
1,030 percent instead of 900 percent, we see a reduction in welfare losses across all regions except
Annex-I oil importers. Welfare for Saudi, OPEC, and Annex-I oil exporters improves due to the
new higher international price of crude. We see the biggest impacts of Saudi’s reaction on welfare
in OPEC countries where welfare improves by 6.6 percentage points compared to the case with
no Saudi strategic reaction. This is explained by the fact that OPEC countries and Annex-I
oil exporters ride the wave of the new higher oil prices resulting from Saudi’s reduction in its
crude exports without those countries reducing their own crude exports. Welfare in Annex-I oil
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Figure 3.11: Change in global crude demand, Saudi crude supply, and international price of
crude under an endogenous cap policy with a global target
emissions relaxing the cap on the region’s emissions does not offset the impact of the higher oil
prices on their consumption. Reduction in welfare losses in the rest of the world is explained by
welfare improvements in other regions where demand for exports from the rest of the world offsets
the negative effects of higher crude prices.
Carbon leakage levels are slightly different from the case under the assumption of competitive
oil markets (see Table 3.3). Total CO2 leakage is 22.5 percent compared to 19.7 percent under the
competitive oil market assumption. Leakage rates under the endogenous cap assumption are larger
than rates under the fixed cap assumption, again reflecting the large endogenous cap. The increase
is explained by the higher effective cap in Annex-I countries which induces more leakage through
the competitiveness channel since cost of production of energy intensive goods in Annex-I countries
increases as the cap on emissions in those countries increases. The difference between both cases
is an incremental increase of 0.31 percent under the case of an endogenous cap.
If we assume that Saudi Arabia re-optimizes its markup to mitigate some of the negative welfare
















































Figure 3.12: Impacts on welfare - CO2 cap in Annex-I endogenous
rate is slashed by more than half, from 22.5 percent under the benchmark markup scenario of 900
percent to 10.2 percent when Saudi increases its markup to 1,030 percent. The significant increase
in the crude exports markup results in large increases to the international crude price. When Saudi
re-optimized its markup, the international price of crude increases to a level that is higher than the
price prior to the policy implementation in Annex-I countries, see Figure 3.11. This large increase
in crude prices reduces demand for crude oil in the abating and non-abating regions and encourages
switching to other less carbon intensive fuels. It also reduces leakage through the competitiveness
channel since the differential in fuel prices for energy intensive goods is not as large under this
scenario.
3.4 Sensitivity Analysis
We tested the robustness of our results to changes in the elasticity of substitution between fossil
fuels in production and consumption in our model, changes in the elasticity of the marginal cost
curve for Saudi Arabia’s oil production, and to changes in the elasticity of supply of other OPEC


































Figure 3.13: CO2 Leakage - CO2 cap in Annex-I endogenous
induces changes in the relative prices of fossil fuels. Crude oil prices are increased by the increase
in markup on Saudi crude oil exports which makes crude oil more expensive relative to the variety
of other fuels available for consumption or as input in other goods production. The ability of Saudi
Arabia and OPEC to respond to demand changes also has an effect on oil prices and therefore the
choice consumers and producers make between the available fossil fuels.
In Table 3.4 we increase and decrease the reference values of the three central parameters (fuel
substitution elasticity σE , Saudi’s elasticity of the marginal cost curve ηsaudi, and OPEC’s supply
Table 3.2: Impact on Welfare by Region (% Change in Consumption)
Competitive Oil Market Saudi Cost Advantage
Benchmark Re-Optimize
Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous
Cap Cap Cap Cap Cap Cap
SAU -4.65 -3.54 -13.83 -9.96 -11.83 -9.67
OPEC -2.80 -2.13 -6.01 -4.32 0.57 -2.49
AXIOI -0.16 -0.11 -0.13 -0.08 -0.30 -0.15
AXIOE -0.13 -0.08 -0.22 -0.15 0.50 0.07
ROW -0.07 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 -0.24 -0.03
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Table 3.3: Impacts on CO2 Leakage (%)
Competitive Oil Market Saudi Cost Advantage
Benchmark Re-Optimize
Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous Endogenous Exogenous
Cap Cap Cap Cap Cap Cap
Total 19.74 22.25 22.51 22.20 10.22 17.92
Decomposed by non-coalition region
OPEC -0.42 -0.93 -1.03 -0.91 -0.07 -0.52
China 1.77 2.47 2.64 2.53 -0.82 1.30
India 2.57 2.99 3.04 3.01 1.33 2.44
ROW 12.52 14.10 14.31 14.11 7.44 11.60
elasticity ηopec) independently by a factor of 50 percent. Increasing σE results in an increased
ability for consumers to switch to other less carbon intensive fuels which drives leakage levels down.
This is evident if we compare the leakage levels when the markup is held constant a the benchmark
level. As the elasticity of fuel substitution increases, demand elasticity for oil increases and Saudi
Arabia’s ability to increase its markup diminishes. Therefore a lower re-optimized markup prevails
under this scenario relative to the reference scenario. This lower re-optimized markup means lower
oil prices compared to the reference scenario. Demand in non-abating regions is higher compared to
the reference scenario which means we have higher leakage levels when Saudi re-optimizes relative
to the reference case. This trumps the increased ability to substitute away from oil as we see in
the table. Therefore, when Saudi reacts strategically, carbon leakage levels are higher under an
assumption of higher elasticity of fuel substitution. The impacts on global welfare are moderate
under the different fuel elasticity assumptions in the table. As expected, global welfare is improved
by the increased ability for consumers and producers to substitute between fossil fuels.
As Saudi Arabia’s ability to respond to global crude oil demand shocks increases, so does carbon
leakage levels. Increased elasticity of marginal cost curve for Saudi, while other oil exporters supply
elasticities remain at the reference levels, means that more of the negative shock in the global oil
market is absorbed by Saudi Arabia. This results in Saudi Arabia having less ability to increase
its markup compared to the reference case which results in lower re-optimized oil prices and in
turn higher leakage levels compared to the reference case. Global welfare is made worse as Saudi
Arabia’s ability to respond to oil demand changes diminishes. Global welfare levels are made worse
by the increased oil prices, compared to the reference value, when Saudi Arabia’s supply elasticity
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is lowered.
Carbon leakage levels are increased as we increase OPEC crude oil supply elasticity. As OPEC’s
supply elasticity is increased, Saudi Arabia’s ability to increase the markup is diminished which
results in lower oil prices. This in turn results in higher carbon leakage levels compared to the
reference scenario. Effects on global welfare are minimal as we vary OPEC’s supply elasticity by
a 50 percent on either side. There is a slight improvement in global welfare as OPEC’s supply
elasticity is increased due to the reduced residual oil demand that Saudi Arabia faces and hence
the lower oil prices that prevail under this scenario.
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Table 3.4: Sensitivity Analysis
Saudi Maintains Saudi Re-Optimizes
Benchmark Markup Markup
Global Total Re-Optimized Global Total
Welfare Change Carbon Leakage Markup Welfare Change Carbon Leakage
Reference -0.32 22.51 1,030 -0.24 10.22
0.5×σE -0.34 22.92 1,040 -0.23 8.56
1.5×σE -0.31 22.03 1,010 -0.24 12.58
0.5×ηsaudi -0.33 22.69 1,030 -0.24 11.33
1.5×ηsaudi -0.32 22.37 1,020 -0.24 10.84
0.5×ηOPEC -0.32 22.51 1,030 -0.24 10.15
1.5×ηOPEC -0.32 22.40 1,020 -0.24 11.23
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3.5 Conclusion
We show in this paper that there is ample scope for Saudi Arabia to react strategically to
sub-global climate policy initiatives. This reaction mitigates some of the negative impacts of those
policies on its welfare. Under our assumption of a dominant role for Saudi Arabia in the inter-
national oil markets, Saudi welfare is hit hard by even a modest cap on CO2 emissions in a large
abating region. Saudi welfare undergoes significant declines if Annex-I countries cap their emissions
at 90 percent of the baseline. Welfare is even hit harder if Annex-I countries enforce an endogenous
cap to target global reductions in CO2 emissions. Impacts on other regions’ welfare as a result of
the Saudi strategic reaction depend on their status as an oil importer or exporter. Oil exporters
enjoy significant reductions in the the level of negative impacts resulting from the climate policy as
Saudi reacts by increasing its crude oil exports markup. Oil importers are made worse off by the
reaction under both an assumption of an endogenous and a set emissions cap in Annex-I countries.
Carbon leakage rates are significantly reduced as a result of a Saudi strategic reaction. Total
leakage rates range between 10.2 percent to 17.9 percent as a result of Saudi Arabia’s strategic
reaction while leakage rates are 22 percent if Saudi maintains its benchmark markup on crude
exports. The level of reduction in leakage rates as a result of Saudi’s reaction is dependent on the
existence of a global emissions target. In our analysis we find that the best action Annex-I countries
could take to minimize CO2 leakage rates is to enforce an endogenous emissions cap. This comes
at a price of slightly worse welfare levels but lower global emission.
Our results are sensitive to our assumptions about the fossil fuel substitution elasticities, Saudi’s
elasticity of the marginal cost curve, and OPEC’s supply elasticity. The values we assign to these
elasticites are based on what is commonly used in the literature and on our own knowledge of the
nature of supply for Saudi Arabia and OPEC. Econometrically deriving values for these parameters
might provide more accurate and realistic responses in our model, although data and methodological
limitations often prevent a credible estimation of some of these key parameters.
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CHAPTER 4
MAINTAINING LOW OIL PRICES BY SAUDI ARABIA AND THE IMPACTS OF THAT ON
CLIMATE POLICY
In this essay we consider the conjecture that Saudi Arabia is intentionally maintaining lower
than optimal, from the perspective of national income, oil prices for non-pecuniary reasons. We
assume that there is an agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia where the US provides security
and political support for Saudi Arabia while Saudi Arabia ensures uninterrupted oil supplies to the
West. We quantify the non-pecuniary benefits that Saudi Arabia gains. We pose the question of
what would be the effects on economic welfare and emissions levels of this agreement between the
US and Saudi Arabia breaking down as a result of the US participating in a climate policy coalition.
Against this background, we adopt a set of priors on key parameters in our model that result in
Saudi Arabia’s markup on oil exports being below the level that would maximize national income.
We estimate the effects of an emissions cap policy in Annex-I countries on the Saudi Arabian
welfare. Assuming the US takes part in the emissions cap policy which significantly harms Saudi
Arabia, we believe Saudi Arabia might retaliate by imposing an optimal markup oil exports. We
then analyze the effects of a retaliation in the form of a tariff on oil by Annex-I countries collectively,
or by the US unilaterally. We find the Nash equilibrium that emerges that ensures each player is
maximizing its welfare given the action of the other player. We find that Annex-I acting as a group
has more ability than the US acting unilaterally to appropriate Saudi Arabia’s oil rents. This has
an adverse impact on Saudi Arabia’s welfare and carbon leakage.
In Chapters 2 and 3 we considered the possible strategic reaction by Saudi Arabia as a response
to sub-global climate policies. Saudi Arabia’s markup on crude exports in the previous two chapters
is assumed to be optimal, from the perspective of national income, in the benchmark. We find that
under a sub-global climate policy in a sufficiently large coalition, negative impacts on Saudi Arabia’s
welfare are severe. Saudi Arabia has the incentive and the ability to react to the climate policy to
mitigate some of the negative impacts on its welfare. We, however, make the assumption that the
rest of world, including the coalition, does not react to Saudi Arabia’s strategic reaction. In reality,
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the coalition has significant market power on the demand side and, as we argue in this chapter,
indeed has the incentive and the ability to retaliate to the Saudi action by imposing a tariff on
Saudi oil. Given the market power that the coalition has, it has the ability to impose tariffs in
the benchmark as well, but we argue it doesn’t due to a tacit agreement it (the West and most
importantly the US) has with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia in return must be giving up something
in the benchmark as well. We argue that Saudi Arabia maintains lower than optimal, from the
perspective of national income, oil prices to satisfy the agreement it has with the US.
Our contribution in this paper is threefold. First, we examine the historical evidence that Saudi
Arabia has maintained low oil prices as a quid pro quo for security and political support from the
US. We also try to quantify, in dollar terms, how much Saudi Arabia is forgoing in national income
to gain the non-pecuniary benefits from the US. Second, we find out what would be the impact on
welfare in the US, or Annex-I countries, if it exercises its market power on the import side in the
oil markets. Third, we answer the question of what would be the impacts on welfare and carbon
leakage if the treaty between the US and Saudi no longer binds and each party acts to maximize
its welfare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 4.1 we provide a historical context
of the agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia. In Section 4.2 and 4.3 we outline the numerical
general equilibrium model and the policy counterfactuals we adopt in our analysis. In Section 4.4
we outline the implications of the actions of Saudi Arabia and the climate policy coalition. We
finally conclude in Section 4.5.
4.1 Background
Crude oil, unlike most other commodities, has been a primary factor in many of the major
political events that transpired over the previous century. It is arguably the most politicized
market. A quote from former Secretary of State Kissinger (1982) underlines how hard it is to
separate economic from political factors when considering oil:
“Aside from our military defense, there is no project of more central importance to
our national security and indeed our independence as a sovereign nation than energy
saving, import independence and consumer cooperation.”
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The economic welfare of oil exporting nations has not always been the principal objective when oil
agreements were made between countries endowed with the resource and the companies or foreign
countries helping them exploit it. Anecdotal evidence from the history of oil states includes many
instances when western oil companies obtained oil concessions at prices well below what would
have been optimal from the perspective of national income. An example of this was in the 1950’s
when Aramco, before the Saudi Government took full control of it, was paying a royalty of 28 cents
a barrel to the Saudi Government while the posted oil price was $1.75 (Claes, 2001). Even after
the Saudi Government took full control of its national resource in 1974, the Saudi Government’s
preoccupation with security was a factor in the final agreement that transferred control to the
Saudi Government. The decades following World War II were a turbulent time in the Middle East.
Communist inspired Arab Nationalism was gaining grounds on all sides of Saudi Arabia. Arab
revolutionaries took control of many countries surrounding Saudi Arabia, and the country was
the largest prize yet to be won. Pressure was also building from within the country by domestic
communist groups who were inspired by the advances of their comrades in neighboring countries.
The larger population was also demanding a larger share and participation in national wealth. The
Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973 only exacerbated this situation. Saudi Arabia was coming under
intense pressure from other Arab countries as it was perceived to be complicit with the US against
the greater aspirations of the Arab nation. The option for Saudi Arabia was to fold within the
wave of the greater Arab nation, envisioned and led by the popular Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel
Nasser, and surrender its sovereignty or to ally itself with a world power that would ensure its
security and continued political independence. Given the historical relationship Saudi Arabia had
with the US and the decline of the British colonial presence in the region, the option of who that
world power would be was clear. At the culmination of the Aramco transfer negotiations to the
full control of Saudi Arabia, an agreement was made with the US in which Saudi Arabia receives
continued military and security assistance from the US if Saudi Arabia keeps the flow of oil to
the US uninterrupted. In 1974, the Saudi Arabian Deputy Prime Minister, later to become King,
Fahad signed
an agreement for extensive US-Saudi military and economic cooperation. The agree-
ment was described by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger as “a milestone in U.S. rela-
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tions with Saudi Arabia and Arab countries in general.” It involved massive American
assistance to the Kingdom in planning and implementing its economic and military
development and in return called for Saudi cooperation in meeting energy needs of the
United States and its Western allies (Golub, 1985).
US military sales and support program to Saudi Arabia significantly expanded following the 1970’s.
Saudi Arabia is by far the largest buyer of US military equipment. By 2006, US military sales to
Saudi Arabia amounted to $80 billion (Blanchard, 2008). An additional $90 billion worth of military
sales were made between 2006 and 2011 (Blanchard, 2015). On the Saudi side, oil supplies to the
west were never interrupted since the agreement. Saudi Arabia has always been a reliable supplier
of oil to the US and at many times increased its supplies to maintain low oil prices. Visits to Saudi
Arabia by high level US government officials, many times the president himself, increase significantly
during times of high oil prices. The most recent example of this was when US president George W.
Bush visited Saudi Arabia in 2008, a year when oil prices reached record levels, to request increased
supplies by Saudi Arabia to lower oil prices. Saudi Arabia responded by pumping an additional
300 thousand barrels of oil (Stolberg & Mouawad, 2008). This supports our argument that Saudi
Arabia has likely maintained below optimal oil prices from the perspective of maximizing national
income. This is done to satisfy an energy-for-security agreement with the US. Any deviation from
this agreement by either party could potentially prompt a retaliation by the other.
A possible retaliatory measure by the US would be a tariff on imports of oil from Saudi Arabia.
For western policy makers, particularly in the US, the option is attractive for multiple reasons. A
tariff on oil imports is an instrument that helps preserve the domestic oil industry and therefore the
energy security and independence of the US, a subject that has preoccupied governing Administra-
tions since the the Seventies. American policy makers have always had conflicting interests when
it comes to oil prices. On the one hand low oil prices reduce gasoline prices for the policy makers’
constituents and are generally perceived to be a precursor for strong economic growth. On the
other hand low oil prices weaken the high cost domestic oil industry, thereby, at least in the minds
of the policy makers, the US is left vulnerable to energy supplies from foreign countries. The goal
of preserving a healthy domestic oil industry dates back to the Eisenhower Administration where,
under pressure from oil states in the US, in 1959 a quota on imports, another form of an import
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restraint, was put in place that mandated imports not to exceed 9 percent of total consumption.
Another instance was during the Reagan Administration when oil prices dipped below $10 per
barrel in 1986. Then Vice President, George H. Bush, in an official visit to Saudi Arabia warned
his hosts that the United States Congress would be forced to consider oil import tariffs to preserve
the American oil industry if Saudi Arabia, along with other OPEC members, does not act to raise
oil prices. By the end of that year, OPEC came to an agreement to restructure its quota system
that would double prices within a year (Yergin, 1991). Currently, oil tariffs seem to be a popular
option in the press for ensuring a healthy and a viable domestic unconventional oil industry in the
US (Cobb, 2014; Mankiw, 2006; Register, 2014). Another advantage of oil tariffs for oil importers
is that it is an efficient mechanism to allow the importers to reap some of the economic rents of
the oil exporting countries. This notion has been discussed extensively in the economic literature.
Bergstrom (1980) finds that with a fixed supply good, if a uniform tariff is collected from all con-
sumers then the burden of the tax falls entirely on the supplier. Oil tariffs are also popular among
environmental groups since the higher domestic oil prices they generate reduce oil consumption and
make it easier to promote renewable energy. Finally, tariffs are generally perceived as a political
weapon for countries with large market power on the import side. Tariffs, or outright blockade
on oil imports, from countries not aligned with the strategic interests of the US have been used
extensively, most notably in recent years against Iraq in the Nineties and Iran more recently, who
were at one time two of the closest allies of the US in the Middle East. One should not discount
the possibility that the same measure be taken against other oil exporters if the conditions call for
it.
4.2 Model
We adopt the same general setup we have in Chapter 3 to represent production and consump-
tion. We modify the regional aggregation to focus the analysis on the four regions most relevant to
this chapter: Saudi Arabia, the US, Annex-I countries, and the rest of the world. A parsimonious
aggregation is chosen in this chapter to keep the strategic interactions clear. We aggregate the
regions into two main groups: non-coalition group which includes Saudi Arabia and an aggregate
of the rest of world and a coalition group which includes Annex-I countries and the US. Table
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Table 4.1 lists the aggregation for the GTAP regions, sectors, and factors of production in this
model.
Table 4.1: Aggregated Sectors and Regions in the Model
REGIONS
Non-Coalition Saudi Arabia, Rest of the World
Coalition Annex-I countries, USA
SECTORS
Energy Coal, Crude Oil, Natural Gas, Refined Petroleum Products,
Electricity
Energy Intensive Air Transport, Mining, Non-Metalic Minerals, Non-Ferrous Met-
als, Machinery
Transport, Steel Industry, Petrochemicals
Other All Other Goods
FACTORS OF PRODUCTION
Capital, Labor (skilled and unskilled), Natural Resources
The model is modified to account for the possible reaction by the coalition group collectively or
by the US acting unilaterally. We maintain the use of the markup on crude exports as the preferred
instrument by Saudi Arabia to react to climate policy. We introduce an import tariff implemented
in the coalition countries on crude oil imports as a potential retaliatory instrument. Imposing
a tariff on imports of oil from Saudi Arabia by a large importer, Annex-I or the US, negatively
impacts Saudi welfare through an adverse terms-of-trade effect. We make the assumption that
Saudi Arabia will optimize its crude exports markup at each tariff level applied to its oil exports
to the coalition countries. We enumerate the outcomes to find the Nash equilibrium where each
player is maximizing private welfare conditional on the actions of the other player.
As is the case in Chapter 2, production is captured in the model by nested constant elasticity
of substitution (CES) cost functions that combine natural resources, capital, labor, energy and
materials. Figure Figure 3.1 shows the nesting of non-energy sectors production. At the bottom
level of the energy nest, coal and gas are combined to form a coal-gas composite. This composite is
combined with other energy products (refined oil, crude, and electricity) to form the energy input
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composite. The energy composite is combined with a composite of capital and labor, referred to
in the Figure Figure 4.1 as KLE. The KLE composite is then combined with materials to form the
KLEM composite. Finally, KLEM is combined with resources to produce the final product. This
nested structure represents the production of all goods in the economy except primary fuels.
Resources 
Capital, Labor , Energy, Materials 
Capital - Labor 
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Figure 4.1: Nesting Structure for Non-energy Sectors
Primary fuels (crude, natural gas, and coal) are represented by a three-level nested production
function. Figure Figure 4.2 shows the nesting structure for primary fuels production. At the bottom
level capital and labor are combined to form the KL composite. This composite is combined with
materials to form the KLM nest (non-energy nest). At the top level the KLM nest is combined
with the energy nest which is represented similarly to the energy nest in the production in non-
primary fuels sectors (combining refined oil, crude, electricity, and a composite of coal and gas).
The electricity and refined oil sectors use the same nesting as the primary fuels nesting except
resources are not inputs to production in these two sectors. Figure Figure 4.3 shows the nesting
structure for the electricity and refined oil sectors.
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Materials Capital - Labor 
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Figure 4.2: Nesting Structure for Primary Fuel Sectors
Energy Inputs Non Energy (Capital, Labor and Materials) 
Materials Capital - Labor 
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Figure 4.3: Nesting Structure for Electricity and Refined Oil Sectors
Final demand is represented in the model by two agents, households and government. House-
holds maximize their welfare by spending their total income (factor income minus tax payments)
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on the consumption of a bundle of energy goods combined with an aggregate of other consumption
goods. Figure Figure 4.4 shows the nesting for household consumption. Government generates





ele oil gas coal cru 
σGC 
Figure 4.4: Nesting of Agent’s Consumption
its income through collecting taxes and resource rents and spends it on the provision of public
goods and services. The size of government is held fixed in the model using a constraint that varies
the tax collected from households as the rent on resources changes. Goods and services on the
international market are traded according to Armington where they are distinguished by place of
production (Armington, 1969). Domestic and foreign varieties are not perfect substitutes in the
model so each region demands a bundle of domestic and foreign goods. The exception to this in our
model is crude oil which is treated as a homogeneous good. This is consistent with Balistreri et al.
(2010) where they find the elasticity of subsitution between different grades of crude oil, originating
from multiple regions, is high. Figure Figure 4.5 shows demand for imports and domestic goods.
Consistent with Chapters 2 and 3, we maintain the dominant role for Saudi Arabia in the oil
markets. We embed its cost advantage into our model by assuming a marginal cost of 10 percent of
the price of oil in the baseline data. We, however, depart from the assumption that Saudi Arabia is
maximizing pecuniary returns in the benchmark. We calibrate on our priors of what the elasticities
are of the marginal cost curve for Saudi Arabia and the fringe. We find that maintaining the
same elasticity we use in Chapters 2 and 3 for Saudi Arabia while reducing the fringe’s supply
elasticity to zero, consistent with Anderson et al. (2014), results in the benchmark markup of
56




Figure 4.5: Nesting of Armington Composite
900 percent being sub-optimal. Figure Figure 4.6 illustrates the results of this calibration. Saudi
Arabia is capable of improving its welfare by 0.4 percent if it increases its markup an additional
50 percentage points. This translates to approximately $0.5 billion in private consumption. We
assume, however, that Saudi Arabia chooses to maintain the sub-optimal markup as a form of
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Figure 4.6: Impacts on Saudi Arabia’s welfare as the markup on its crude oil exports changes
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4.3 Policy Experiment
The policy experiment we consider in our model is a cap on benchmark CO2 emissions in
Annex-I countries except Russia. The cap we assume in this scenario is an endogenous cap that
ensures global emissions are reduced by 10 percent of the baseline Annex-I emissions. We maintain
the same policy under two potential strategic reactions by the West: Annex-I countries collectively
imposing a tariff on crude imports and the US unilaterally imposing the tariff. We analyze the
two scenarios, Annex-I collectively imposing a tariff and the US imposing a tariff unilaterally, to
estimate the effect of the size of the coalition applying the tariff on our results. We remove all
oil import tariffs in all countries in the benchmark to be able to apply a uniform tariff across all
regions without any country specific distortions. We allow Saudi Arabia to strategically react to
the carbon policy by varying its markup on oil exports. We simultaneously allow Annex-I and the
US to impose uniform tariffs on their oil imports and solve for the Nash equilibrium that emerges.
4.4 Results
We first consider the results under a unilateral action by the US and then widen the scope of
the retaliatory action and include all other Annex-I countries.
4.4.1 Results Under Tariff in The US
In this section we consider a scenario where tariffs on Saudi oil imports are imposed only in
the US. Unilaterally imposing an oil tariff in the US is an easier feat politically than collectively
imposing a tariff among all of Annex-I countries. This is a more plausible scenario than a tax across
all of Annex-I. We start our analysis with looking at the impacts of imposing a tariff on oil imports
in the US under no carbon policy. Import tariffs on crude in Annex-I countries are removed in
the benchmark to eliminate any distortions from differences in country specific tariffs. We then
incrementally increase the tariff in the US on oil imports. Figure Figure 4.7 illustrates the impacts
of increasing the benchmark oil tariff on welfare in the US. The results show that the US’s optimal
oil tariff is 30 percent. The improvement in welfare, however, is minor, equivalent to $800 million
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Figure 4.7: Impacts on US welfare from a tariff on Saudi imports with no emissions policy
Even without an emissions policy that the US participates in, if the US imposes any oil tariffs
on oil then Saudi Arabia has an incentive to retaliate by optimally marking up its crude exports
resulting in increased oil prices. We analyze the impact of varying Saudi Arabia’s oil export markup
at each tariff level that the US imposes. We find the Nash equilibrium that maximizes each player’s
private welfare given the actions of the other player. Table Table 4.2 shows the equivalent variation
local to the Nash equilibrium with alternative variations in the Saudi oil export markup and the US
tariff on Saudi oil. We find that the US tariff impacts Saudi Arabia’s welfare negatively but does
not affect its optimal markup level. Increasing the markup on Saudi oil exports negatively affects
US welfare but does not affect the optimal tariff level. It is obvious from Table Table 4.2 why the
US does not impose a tariff given the possible reaction from Saudi which, at the equilibrium, would
reduce US welfare below the level it would be at if it did not act to begin with. What is not obvious
from Table Table 4.2 is why Saudi Arabia does not increase its markup since even with a reaction
from the US its welfare would still be better than if it maintains the benchmark markup. This
can only be explained by the fact that these results do not account for the non-pecuniary benefits
Saudi obtains by not increasing its markup
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Table 4.2: Welfare impacts on Saudi Arabia and the US under different Saudi oil markup
and US tariff levels with no emissions policy
Saudi Markup USA tariff on oil imports (%)
(%)
0 10 20 30 40
900 SAU EV 0.000 -0.096 -0.118 -0.110 -0.093
US EV 0.000 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.008
925 0.274 0.192 0.180 0.195 0.218
-0.054 -0.048 -0.046 -0.045 -0.046
950 0.358 0.286 0.282 0.302* 0.329
-0.106 -0.100 -0.098 -0.098 -0.098
975 0.281 0.216 0.217 0.242 0.272
-0.156 -0.151 -0.149 -0.148 -0.149
1000 0.077 0.013 0.016 0.043 0.076
-0.205 -0.199 -0.198 -0.197 -0.198
* Nash equilibrium
Introducing an endogenous emissions cap in Annex-I countries significantly affects Saudi Ara-
bia’s welfare. Without either party, the US or Saudi, taking any strategic reaction in response to
the policy, Saudi Arabia’s welfare drops by 20.2 percent. Without the imposition of an oil tariff in
the US, Saudi Arabia’s new optimal markup under the policy is 1,175 percent, or an additional 275
percent above the benchmark markup. The impacts of this increased markup on Saudi Arabia’s
welfare is significant. The loss to Saudi Arabia’s welfare from the carbon policy is reduced by half
under the new re-optimized markup.
The effects of the carbon policy on welfare in the US are shown in Table Table 4.4. Under an
assumption of no oil tariffs in the US, welfare in the US improves by 0.04 percent. Even though
the carbon policy has a negative effect on US welfare, that effect is offset by the increased demand
for US exports by the non-coalition region. The non-coalition gains from the reduced energy prices
resulting from the carbon policy in Annex-I countries. That effect is not enough, however, to offset
the negative impacts of increased oil prices resulting form Saudi Arabia’s increased markups. The
negative impacts on US welfare resulting from Saudi Arabia’s strategic reaction can be somewhat
mitigated by imposing a tariff on oil imports. The large rents Saudi Arabia gains from the significant
markup on its crude exports creates an incentive for the US to appropriate part of those rents. The
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Table 4.3: Welfare impacts on Saudi Arabia and the US under different Saudi oil markup
and US tariff levels with emissions policy
Saudi Markup USA tariff on oil imports (%)
(%)
0 10 20 30 40 50
1100 SAU EV -11.47 -11.70 -11.79 -11.80 -11.80 -11.78
US EV -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35 -0.35
1125 -11.20 -11.43 -11.51 -11.52 -11.51 -11.49
-0.40 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39 -0.39
1150 -11.06 -11.28 -11.36 -11.37 -11.36 -11.34
-0.44 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43
1175 -11.05 -11.26 -11.34* -11.35 -11.33 -11.31
-0.48 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47
1200 -11.15 -11.36 -11.43 -11.44 -11.42 -11.40
-0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.51 -0.51
* Nash equilibrium
US’s welfare decreases as Saudi Arabia increases its markup. Compared to the case under no
carbon policy (Table Table 4.2), we find that the US’s ability to appropriate the oil rents from
Saudi Arabia through a tariff diminishes as the international price of oil rises. The US’s optimal oil
imports tariff decreases as Saudi Arabia increases its markup on crude exports. The US consumers’
ability to substitute to other goods away from oil diminishes as they are forced to use less of it due
to higher oil prices. This makes the negative impacts of the increased markup progressively worse
for consumers in the US. Saudi Arabia’s welfare is also made progressively worse by the oil tariff in
US. Saudi Arabia is able to mitigate some of those negative impacts by increasing its markup. A
Nash equilibrium emerges under a Saudi markup of 1,175 percent and an oil tariff in the US of 20
percent. Table Table 4.3 shows the variations in welfare local to the Nash equilibrium as we make
alternative assumptions about Saudi Arabia’s markup and the US tariff. Under this equilibrium,
the 20 percent oil tariff imposed in the US reduces Saudi Arabia’s welfare by an additional 0.3
percentage points, or equivalently by $327 million in private consumption. The US is able to
improve its welfare by 0.01 percent relative to the case with no tariff and a re-optimized markup
by Saudi Arabia. This is equivalent to approximately $1 billion in private consumption in the US.
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The impacts of these actions by Saudi Arabia and the US on carbon leakage are negligible.
Table Table 4.4 shows welfare and carbon leakage levels under the scenarios of maintaining the
benchmark markup and tariff, Saudi’s re-optimized markup absent US oil tariff, and under the
Nash equilibrium. Carbon leakage as a result of the policy itself is isolated by maintaining the
benchmark Saudi oil exports markup at 900 percent and Annex-I oil imports tariff at 0 percent.
Carbon leakage is 38.2 percent under this scenario. Leakage is significantly decreased by the
increased markup on Saudi oil exports. Increased oil prices forces the non-coalition region to
switch to less carbon intensive fuels. Leakage drops to 3.1 percent under the re-optimized markup
of 1,175 percent. The tariff in the US works in the opposite direction where increased tariff levels
on oil imports increases leakage. This effect is modest under this scenario since the tariff is low and
in a smaller region, compared to the optimal tariff when its applied across all Annex-I countries.
Imposing a 20 percent tariff on oil imports in the US results in an increase in carbon leakage relative
to the case with no import tariff. The new carbon leakage level under this scenario is 4 percent.
Table 4.4: Impacts on welfare and carbon leakage under different strategic reactions by Saudi
Arabia and the US
% Change USA Welf % Change SAU Welf Total CO2
(∆ in Consumption - $Bn) (∆ in Consumption - $Bn) Leakage (%)
Saudi markup: 900%, 0.04 -20.24 38.23
USA tariff: 0% (3.97) (-22.03)
Saudi markup: 1175%, -0.48 -11.05 3.12
USA tariff: 0% (-47.58) (-12.02)
Saudi markup: 1175%, -0.47 -11.34 3.95
USA tariff: 20% (-46.89) (-12.34)
4.4.2 Results Under Tariff in Annex-I
In this section we estimate the impacts of increasing the US’s market power on the oil import
side by including other Annex-I countries in the tariff policy. The US accounts for approximately
23 percent of global oil demand (Table Table 2.3). Including other Annex-I countries more than
doubles this share of global crude demand to 51 percent. Restricting Saudi oil imports from a
region that consumes more than half the global supply will likely have a more sever impact on
Saudi welfare than if the tariff was limited to the US. We first look at the impacts of imposing a
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tariff on oil imports in Annex-I countries under no carbon policy. Given the assumption that oil
is a homogeneous good in our model, import tariffs on crude in Annex-I countries are removed in
the benchmark to eliminate any distortions from differences in country specific tariffs. We then
incrementally increase the tariff in Annex-I countries on oil imports. We do this first, prior to
the carbon policy, to disentangle the effects on Annex-I welfare from the carbon policy and the
application of the tariff. Figure Figure 4.8 illustrates the impacts of increasing the benchmark
oil tariff on Annex-I welfare from private consumption. The results show that Annex-I countries
optimal oil tariff is 70 percent. Annex-I countries private consumption increases by 0.12 percent,
or by $28.8 billion under the optimal tariff. Welfare impacts on Saudi Arabia under the emissions
policy in Annex-I countries are significant. Without either party, Annex-I or Saudi, taking any
strategic reaction in response to the policy, Saudi Arabia’s welfare drops by 20.2 percent. Since
we assume zero supply elasticity for all other oil producers in this chapter, including other OPEC
members, the reduction in global oil demand is completely borne by Saudi Arabia. This explains
the larger impact on Saudi Arabia’s welfare compared with the results in Chapters 2 and 3. The
combination of: 1. reduced elasticity for Saudi Arabia’s oil exports, given the increase in relative
prices of all fuels due to the carbon policy, 2. the reduced fuel substitution elasticity and 3. the
reduced elasticity of other oil producers we assume in this chapter allows Saudi Arabia to increase
the markup on its oil exports. Without the imposition of an oil tariff in Annex-I countries, Saudi
Arabia’s new optimal markup under the policy is 1,175 percent, or an additional 275 percent
above the benchmark markup. The impacts of this increased markup on Saudi Arabia’s welfare
is significant. The loss to Saudi Arabia’s welfare from the carbon policy is reduced by half under
the new re-optimized markup. This result is consistent with the findings of Chapter 3 where an
increase in the oil exports markup provides significant improvements in welfare levels. The result is
not surprising given the large percentage the oil sector account for within the overall Saudi Arabian
economy12.
The effects of the carbon policy on Annex-I private consumption are shown in Table Table 4.6.
Under an assumption of no oil tariffs in Annex-I countries, welfare from private consumption in
Annex-I drops by 0.15 percent. Also, Annex-I private consumption is made worse as Saudi Arabia
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Figure 4.8: Impacts on Annex-I welfare from private consumption under a tariff on Saudi
imports with no emissions policy
increases the markup on crude exports and subsequently the international price of crude oil. This
creates an incentive for Annex-I to appropriate part of Saudi Arabia’s oil rents through imposing a
tariff on crude imports and therefore reduce the negative impacts of the increased markup. Annex-I
welfare from private consumption decreases as Saudi Arabia’s increases its markup. Compared to
the case under no carbon policy (Figure Figure 4.8), we find that Annex-I ability to appropriate
some of the oil rents from Saudi Arabia through a tariff diminishes as the international price of oil
rises. Annex-I optimal oil imports tariff decreases as Saudi Arabia increases its markup on crude
exports. When Annex-I consumers are forced to use less oil, due to the increases oil price, their
ability to withstand additional marginal increases on the oil price diminishes and therefore the
impact on their welfare becomes progressively worse. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia’s welfare
is progressively made worse by the imposition of oil tariffs in Annex-I countries. Saudi Arabia is
able to mitigate some of those negative impacts by increasing its markup. A Nash equilibrium
emerges under a Saudi markup of 1,175 percent and an oil tariff in Annex-I countries of 50 percent.
Table Table 4.5 shows the respective welfare measures of Saudi Arabia and the Annex-I coalition
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Table 4.5: Impacts on Saudi Arabia’s welfare and Annex-I consumption under different Saudi
oil markup and Annex-I tariff levels with an emissions policy
Saudi Markup AXI tariff on oil imports(%)
(%)
20 30 40 50 60
1100 SAU EV -14.84 -15.19 -15.22 -15.11 -14.95
AXI ∆ in Cons. -0.38 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36 -0.36
1125 -14.52 -14.84 -14.84 -14.72 -14.55
-0.42 -0.40 -0.40 -0.39 -0.40
1150 -14.33 -14.63 -14.63 -14.49 -14.30
-0.45 -0.44 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43
1175 -14.26 -14.56 -14.54 -14.39* -14.20
-0.49 -0.48 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47
1200 -14.31 -14.59 -14.57 -14.42 -14.22
-0.52 -0.51 -0.51 -0.50 -0.51
* Nash equilibrium
as we make alternative assumptions about the Saudi markup and Annex-I oil tariff. Under this
equilibrium, the 50 percent oil tariff imposed in Annex-I countries reduces Saudi Arabia’s welfare
by an additional four percentage points, or equivalently by $4.4 billion in private consumption.
Disregarding any political considerations, Annex-I countries are always better off by imposing a
tariff on oil imports which explains the popularity of this tariff in the economic literature. However,
Saudi Arabia’s reaction by increasing the markup limits the positive impacts of the oil tariff.
We then consider the impacts of these actions by Saudi Arabia and Annex-I countries on carbon
leakage. Table Table 4.6 shows welfare and carbon leakage levels under the scenarios of maintaining
the benchmark markup and tariff, Saudi’s re-optimized markup absent Annex-I oil tariff, and under
the Nash equilibrium. Carbon leakage as a result of the policy itself is isolated by maintaining the
benchmark Saudi oil exports markup at 900 percent and Annex-I oil imports tariff at 0 percent.
Leakage is 38.2 percent under this scenario. Consistent with the results in Chapter 3, leakage is
significantly decreased by the increased markup on Saudi oil exports. Increased oil prices forces the
non-coalition region to switch to less carbon intensive fuels. Leakage drops to 3.1 percent under
the re-optimized markup of 1,175 percent. The tariff in Annex-I works in the opposite direction
where increased tariff levels on oil imports increases leakage. Higher tariff levels increase oil prices
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in the coalition region which drives oil consumption down. This reduction in oil consumption
reduces international oil prices and therefore increases consumption in the non-coalition. Imposing
a 50 percent tariff on oil imports in Annex-I countries results in an increase in carbon leakage
relative to the case with no import tariff. The new carbon leakage level under this scenario is 13.1
percent. This results presents a difficult situation to the policy makers in Annex-I countries where
an increased tariff level improves their welfare but is damaging to leakage levels. This, however, can
be reconciled with additional border measures that specifically target carbon leakage, e.g. tariff on
imports of energy-intensive goods, or subsidies or emissions credits to local energy-intensive trade
exposed industries; measures that we do not consider in this paper.
Table 4.6: Impacts on welfare and carbon leakage under different strategic reactions by Saudi
Arabia and Annex-I
% Change AXI Welf % Change SAU Welf Total CO2
(∆ in Consumption - $Bn) (∆ in Consumption - $Bn) Leakage (%)
Saudi markup: 900%, -0.15 -20.24 38.23
AXI tariff: 0% (-36.81) (-22.03)
Saudi markup: 1175%, -0.57 -11.05 3.12
AXI tariff: 0% (-137.66) (-12.02)
Saudi markup: 1175%, -0.47 -14.39 13.10
AXI tariff: 50% (-112.53) (-15.66)
The results in this section and 4.5.1 show that the larger the coalition the more rents it can
extract from Saudi Arabia in the form of an oil tariff. However this comes at the expense of higher
leakage levels as the larger reductions in oil consumption in the coalition lead to larger decreases
in oil prices and subsequently higher consumption in non-coalition regions.
4.5 Conclusion
Saudi Arabia and the West have always maintained a strong relationship based largely on
ensuring reliable oil supplies to the West on the Saudi side and continued political and security
support for Saudi Arabia on the West side. This enduring relationship might be threatened by the
prospect of a climate policy in the West. We show in this paper that a climate policy in the West
significantly impacts Saudi Arabia’s welfare. Saudi Arabia then has the incentive to increase the
markup on its crude exports to mitigate the negative impacts on its welfare. The West, Annex-I
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countries acting collectively or the US acting unilaterally, then has the incentive to retaliate to the
increased markup by imposing a tariff on the imports of oil from Saudi Arabia. We find that the
optimal markup for Saudi Arabia is not affected by the tariff but the optimal tariff in Annex-I and
the US is affected by the level of the Saudi markup. Saudi Arabia’s welfare is impacted more by a
tariff applied in Annex-I than the US given the size of oil imports in Annex-I relative to the US.
This also has a larger impact on carbon leakage levels. Annex-I is then faced with the tough choice
between maintaining optimal welfare levels at home by imposing the tariff or higher carbon leakage




Pressure is mounting on policymakers in advanced economies to tackle the problem of climate
change. Support in the scientific community for the detrimental effects of climate change is unan-
imous. Policymakers from around the world have met numerous times under the auspices of the
United Nations and other international organizations to come to an agreement on ways to tackle
climate change. Most of these meetings, however, did not result in an international consensus on
the issue of climate change. The failure of the international community to come to an agreement
on ways to tackle climate change has prompted regional countries to form coalitions that would act
unilaterally. Without a global agreement that would ensure a just and equitable policy mechanism,
some countries will end up with more of the burden than others. Countries that are anticipated
with much of this burden are resource, especially oil, rich countries. A policy to curb emissions,
whether global or sub-global, would significantly harm countries which revenues depend largely
on oil. The role of these oil rich countries in the outcome of sub-global climate initiatives has
been largely ignored in most economic analysis of the subject. An underlying assumption in most
analysis of climate policy is that oil exporters behave competitively in response to any policy that
imposes harm on their economies. In the first essay we presented analysis to show that Saudi Ara-
bia, the largest oil producer and exporter, under certain conditions has the ability to significantly
alter the equilibrium under a tax on crude consumption in a large sub-global coalition. We find
that Saudi Arabia has the ability to improve its welfare by increasing its production and lowering
the international price of crude oil. Also, the effects for carbon leakage are significant under the
same policy. We find that a policy that targets crude oil consumption results in larger carbon
leakage levels. This is a consideration that policymakers in climate policy coalitions should take
into account when comparing climate policy alternatives.
A primary challenge with acting unilaterally is the problem of carbon leakage. Sub-global
climate policies reduce consumption of fossil fuels in the coalition which drives global fossil fuel
prices down. Given the findings in the first essay, we pose the question of what would be the impact
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on carbon leakage if Saudi Arabia exercises its market power and change its oil markup. We show
in this paper that there is ample scope for Saudi Arabia to react strategically to sub-global climate
policy initiatives. Under our assumption of a dominant role for Saudi Arabia in international oil
markets, Saudi welfare is hit hard by even a modest cap on CO2 emissions in a large abating region.
Saudi welfare undergoes significant declines if Annex-I countries cap their emissions at 90 percent
of the baseline. Welfare is even hit harder if Annex-I countries enforce an endogenous cap to target
global reductions in CO2 emissions. Carbon leakage rates are significantly reduced as a result of a
Saudi strategic reaction. Total leakage rates are reduced by half if Saudi Arabia strategically reacts.
The level of reduction in leakage rates as a result of Saudi’s reaction is dependent on the existence
of a global emissions target. In our analysis we find that the best action Annex-I countries could
take to minimize CO2 leakage rates is to enforce an endogenous emissions cap. This comes at a
price of slightly worse welfare levels but lower global emission.
In the final essay, we consider the possibility of a retaliatory action by Annex-I countries or the
US to Saudi Arabia’s strategic reaction to the climate policy. We recognize the US, and Annex-I
countries, market power on the oil demand side and its ability to influence global crude prices and
trade volumes using domestic policies. We present the historical context of why both, Saudi Arabia
and the US, do not exercise their market power in the benchmark. Saudi Arabia and the West
have always maintained a strong relationship based largely on ensuring reliable oil supplies to the
West on the Saudi side and continued political and security support for Saudi Arabia on the West
side. The prospect of a climate policy in the West could threaten this enduring relationship. Saudi
Arabia has the incentive to strategically react to the climate policy by increasing the markup on
its crude exports. The West, Annex-I countries acting collectively or the US acting unilaterally,
then has the incentive to retaliate to the increased markup by imposing a tariff on the imports of
oil. We find that the optimal markup for Saudi Arabia is not affected by the tariff level in Annex-I
countries or the US but the optimal tariff in Annex-I and the US is affected by the level of the
Saudi markup. Saudi Arabia’s welfare is impacted more by a tariff applied in Annex-I than the US
given the size of oil imports in Annex-I relative to the US. This also has a larger impact on carbon
leakage levels. Annex-I is then faced with the tough choice between maintaining optimal welfare
levels at home by imposing the tariff and higher leakage levels.
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The models we utilize in this thesis are all static models. Given that oil, an exhaustible resource,
is central to our analysis, introducing the element of dynamics to the model could alter our results.
A possible extension to this thesis would be analyzing if the behavior of a dominant producer
would be different if we introduce the element of time to our study. A fundamental challenge in the
climate policy analysis has been the prospect of a green paradox, where emissions increase in the
interim period between the announcement and enforcement of the emission policy. If our results
hold in a dynamic model as well, then a dominant player’s role in a climate policy outcome might
also solve, or help reduce, the green paradox problem.
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APPENDIX A - REGION AND SECTOR MAPPINGS








Saudi Arabia Saudi Arabia
UAE United Arab Emirates
Venezuela Venezuela
Annex-I Countries Australia, Austria, Belarus, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg,
Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania,
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Kingdom, United States
Rest of World Rest of Oceania, Hong Kong, South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan, Rest of
East Asia, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, Vietnam, Rest of Southeast Asia Bangladesh, Nepal, Pak-
istan, Sri Lanka, Rest of South Asia, Rest of North America, Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay,
Rest of South America, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua,
Panama, El Salvador, Rest of Central America, Caribbean, Albania,
Rest of Eastern Europe, Rest of Europe, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Rest
of Former Soviet Union, , Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Bahrain, Is-
rael, Oman, Rest of Western Asia, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, Rest of
North Africa, Cameroon, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, Rest of Western
Africa, Central Africa, South Central Africa, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagas-
car, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zim-
babwe, Rest of Eastern Africa, Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, Rest
of South African Customs Union, Rest of the World
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Table A.2: Aggregation of Sectors from GTAP 8 Dataset
GAS Natural Gas
Electricity Electricity and Heat
Oil Refined Oil Products
Coal Coal Transformation
Crude Crude Oil
Iron/Steal Iron and Steel Industry
Chemical Chemical Industry
Non-Ferrous Metals Non-Ferrous Metals
Non-Metalic Minerals Non-Metalic Minerals
Machinery Motor Vehicle and Parts, Transport Equipment, Machinery and
Equipment
Mining Mining
Transport Transport, Water Transport
Air Transport Air Transport
Other Goods All Other Goods
Table A.3: Aggregation of Factors of Production from GTAP 8 Dataset
Capital Land, Capital
Labor Skilled Labor, Unskilled Labor
Natural Resources Natural Resources
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APPENDIX B - OIL SHARE IN ECONOMY AND EMISSIONS BY COUNTRY
Table B.1: CO2 Emission Levels in Annex-I Countries (Gg CO2 Equivalent)
Base year Change
(1990) 2007 (%)
Australia 276,138 393,918 42.7
Austria 62,018 73,980 19.3
Belarus 103,807 58,280 -43.9
Belgium 118,989 117,069 -1.6
Bulgaria 90,092 55,466 -38.4
Canada 459,038 594,659 29.5
Croatia 23,340 25,018 7.2
Cyprus 4,627 8,311 79.6
Czech Republic 164,694 127,237 -22.7
Denmark 54,200 55,860 3.1
Estonia 36,701 18,873 -48.6
Finland 56,644 66,243 16.9
France 398,770 407,254 2.1
Germany 1,042,066 848,549 -18.6
Greece 82,998 113,849 37.2
Hungary 84,378 58,012 -31.2
Iceland 2,160 3,286 52.1
Ireland 32,424 47,214 45.6
Italy 434,656 475,436 9.4
Japan 1,141,138 1,296,155 13.6
Latvia 19,052 8,543 -55.2
Liechtenstein 201 205 1.9
Lithuania 35,785 15,721 -56.1
Luxembourg 11,950 11,382 -4.8
Malta 1,867 2,757 47.7
Monaco 105 92 -12.6
Netherlands 159,236 172,407 8.3
New Zealand 24,916 35,648 43.1
Norway 34,836 45,464 30.5
Poland 469,414 331,557 -29.4
Portugal 45,013 61,899 37.5
Romania 207,007 103,235 -50.1
Russian Federation 2,505,380 1,586,086 -36.7
Slovakia 61,805 39,724 -35.7
Slovenia 16,356 17,034 4.1
Spain 227,508 363,744 59.9
Sweden 57,143 52,027 -9.0
Switzerland 44,639 43,931 -1.6
Turkey 141,560 308,649 118.0
Ukraine 718,894 340,458 -52.6
United Kingdom 591,499 554,252 -6.3
United States 5,100,606 6,116,441 19.9
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Table B.2: Share of Crude Oil Sector in Overall Economy, 2007
Value of Crude Size of Economy Share
Sector ($ Bn) ($ Bn) (%)
Australia 13 862 1.5
Canada 53 1,416 3.8
China 82 3,221 2.5
India 18 1,285 1.4
Iran 103 250 41.1
Kuwait 62 70 89.1
Mexico 51 997 5.1
Nigeria 54 147 36.8
Norway 57 334 17.1
Qatar 19 70 27.4
Rest of Annex-I 81 22,901 0.4
Rest of World 457 7,427 6.2
Russia 195 1,193 16.3
Saudi Arabia 225 268 83.8
UAE 60 239 25.1
USA 137 14,942 0.9
Venezuela 50 212 23.8
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APPENDIX C - GAMS PE MODEL FOR ESSAY 1
1 Parameter
2 alpha inverse demand intercept
3 beta inverse demand slope
4 a intercept of MC schedule
5 b slope of MC schedule
6 mc0 initial marginal cost
7 q0 initial quantity
8 p0 initial price;
9
10 alpha = 10; beta=1;
11 mc0=1;
12 q0=4.5;
13 p0=alpha - beta *q0;
14
15 parameter crit predicted critical value from note;










26 MC marginal cost,









36 P =e= alpha - beta*Q;
37 COST..
38 MC=e= a + b*Q;
39 MREV..
40 MR=e= alpha - 2*beta*Q;
41 EQUL..
42 MR =e= MC;
43









52 toy.iterlim = 0;
53 Solve toy using mcp;






60 toy.iterlim = 1000;







APPENDIX D - GAMS MODEL FOR ESSAY 2
1 $Title Saudi Strategic Response to Climate Policy
2
3 * Khalid Aljihrish, Colorado School of Mines
4 * GAMS Code for Essay 2 of Doctoral Dissertation
5 * April, 2015
6
7 $if not set ds $set ds kyoto_001
8 $include gtap8data
9
10 * number of iterations in policy loop
11 $if not set itr $set itr 25
12 * starting value of SAU rtex in policy loop (5=500% markup over mc)
13 $if not set strtex $set strtex 8.5
14 * addition to SAU rtex in policy loop
15 $if not set addrtex $set addrtex 0.1
16
17 $if not set gtgt $set gtgt yes
18
19 $if not set etaen_ns $set etaen_ns 0.05
20 $if not set etaen_sau $set etaen_sau 15
21 $if not set mc_prop_sau $set mc_prop_sau 0.1
22 $if not set esub $set esub 0.2




27 set sau(r) Saudi subset /SAU/
28 AXI(r) Annex I subset /AXI,USA,NOR,AUS,CAN/
29 AXIOI(r) Annex I oil importers subset /AXI,USA,AUS/
30 AXIOE(r) Annex I oil exporters subset /NOR,CAN/
31 OPEC(r) OPEC subset /ARE,KWT,QAT,SAU,VEN,NGA,IRN/







39 esub(g,r) Top-level elasticity (energy versus non-energy),
40 esubn(g,r) Top-level elasticity (among non-energy goods),
41 esubkl(g,r) Capital-labor elasticity within Each Sector
42 ;
43 esub(g,r) = %esub%;
44 esubn("C",r) = 1;
45 esubkl(g,r) = esubva(g);
46 esubkl("ele",r) = 0.5;
47
48 parameter
49 pubs(r) public spending;
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50
51 pubs(r) = sum(j, vom(j,r)*rto(j,r))
52 +sum(g, sum(i, vdfm(i,g,r)*rtfd(i,g,r) + vifm(i,g,r)*rtfi(i,g,r)))
53 +sum(g, sum(f, vfm(f,g,r)*rtf(f,g,r)))













67 *esubva = elasticity of substitution of labor and capital
68
69 elast(i,"esubkl") = esubva(i);
70
71 *esubm = elasticity of substitution between imports
72
73 elast(i,"esubm") = esubm(i);
74
75 *esubd = elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported products
76









86 set fe(i) Fossil fuels /col, oil, gas, cru/,
87 en(g) Energy goods (including crude) /cru,col,oil,gas/,
88
89 *this is for nesting to allow for substitution
90
91 e(i) Energy inputs /oil,ele,cru,col,gas/,
92
93 *those have a resource input
94
95 xe(i) Exhaustible energy /col,cru,gas/,
96 yy(g,r) Sectors in the model
97 con(g,r) Consumption
98 gov(g,r) Government Consumption
99 cru(g,r) Crude oil sector
100 oil(g,r) Oil refining sector
101 col(g,r) Coal extraction and distribution sector
102 gas(g,r) Gas extraction and distribution sector
103 ele(g,r) Electricity
82
104 oth(g,r) Other sectors;
105
106 Parameter
107 vafm(i,g,r) Armington intermediate demand;
108 vafm(i,g,r) = vdfm(i,g,r)*(1+rtfd(i,g,r)) + vifm(i,g,r)*(1+rtfi(i,g,r));
109
110 vafm(i,g,r)$(round(vafm(i,g,r),5)=0) = 0;
111 vdfm(i,g,r)$(vafm(i,g,r)=0) = 0;




116 oilconsrpt("dtax_rate") = rtfd("OIL","C","SAU");
117 oilconsrpt("ftax_rate") = rtfi("OIL","C","SAU");
118 oilconsrpt("vdfm_vifm") = vdfm("OIL","C","SAU");
119 oilconsrpt("vifm_vifm") = vifm("OIL","C","SAU");






126 * Set up logical arrays which drive the MPSGE production blocks:
127
128 yy(g,r) = yes$(vom(g,r)>0);
129 oil("oil",r) = yes$vom("oil",r);
130 cru("cru",r) = yes$vom("cru",r);
131 ele("ele",r) = yes$vom("ele",r);
132 col("col",r) = yes$vom("col",r);
133 gas("gas",r) = yes$vom("gas",r);
134 gov("g",r) = yes$vom("g",r);
135 con("c",r) = yes;






142 bmkco2(fe,g,r) Benchmark carbon emissions;
143
144 bmkco2(fe,g,r) = 0;
145
146 parameter
147 co2lim(fe,r) Scenario-specific carbon emissions limit;
148 co2lim(fe,r)= 0;
149
150 * Treat resources as a specific factor:
151 * Aggregate factor endowmwnent at market price
152
153 evom("res",r) = 0;
154
155 Parameter
156 etaen(g,r) Elasticity of supply;
157 etaen("col",r) = 1;
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158 etaen("gas",r) = 0.25;
159
160 * One set of conjectural calibrations (bmk is optimal)
161
162 etaen("cru",r) = 0;
163 etaen("cru",OPEC(r)) = %etaen_ns%;






170 esubemult multiplier on esube;
171 esubemult = %esubemult%;
172
173 Parameter
174 esubecons elasticity of substitution between energy types in cons;




179 rvshare(f,r,g) Resource value share;
180 * the value is gross of tax
181 rvshare("res",r,en(i))$vom(i,r) = vfm("res",i,r)*
182 (1+rtf0("res",i,r))/vom(i,r);






189 esubfe(r,g) Elasticity of substitution in fossil energy;









199 * Elasticity of substitution on GTAP for armington in GTAP is high, so we
200 * put upper contraints on it - we pull the min elasticity of substitution
201 * between the imports and composit:
202
203 esubm(i) = min(esubm(i),10);










213 vfmres(f,g,r) Resource-specific factor use
214 vfmshr(g,r) Resource value share;
215
216 vfmshr(g,r)$vfm("res",g,r) = 0.0*vfm("res",g,r)*(1+rtf0("res",g,r)) /
217 sum(mf,vfm(mf,g,r)*(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)));
218
219 vfmres(mf,g,r) = vfmshr(g,r)*vfm(mf,g,r);
220 vfm(mf,g,r) = vfm(mf,g,r)*(1-vfmshr(g,r));
221 display vfmres,vfmshr,esubfe,esub,esubm,esubd,rvshare;
222
223 * SAM adjustment to increase gross output of OIL sector
224 * "refined oil" in Saudi
225
226 parameter
227 theta_OIL proportional increase in OIL output /2.7/
228 OILdif value of adjustment;
229
230 * first pass allocate the increase in oil value to a capital payment
231




236 vom(i,r) = vom(i,r) + OILdif;
237 vfm("cap",i,r) = vfm("cap",i,r)+ OILdif/(1+rtf0("cap",i,r));
238 vdfm(i,"c",r) = vdfm(i,"c",r)+OILdif;
239 rtfd0(i,"c",r) = -OILdif/vdfm(i,"c",r);
240 );
241 );





247 * Aggregate taxes that are sink-activity indexed by domestic and import into
248 * a set of taxes that are not sink-activity indexed.
249
250 Parameter
251 rtda(i,r) Tax on domestic inputs
252 rtia(i,r) Tax on imported inputs
253 rtda0(i,r) Benchmark Tax on domestic inputs
254 rtia0(i,r) Benchmark Tax on imported inputs
255 rtex(g,r) Counterfactual export tax
256 rts(g,r) Subsidy rate;
257
258 rtda(i,r)$sum(g,vdfm(i,g,r)) = sum(g,rtfd(i,g,r)*vdfm(i,g,r))
259 /sum(g,vdfm(i,g,r));









268 rtex0(g,r) = rtex(g,r);
269
270 * We convert bilateral crude oil flows into a global market for crude
271 * oil which is treated as a homogeneous commodity. This involves
272 * accounting for tariffs, export taxes and transport costs in a
273 * systematic manner. The resulting model is otherwise identical to the
274 * Armington model except that export subsidies, import tariffs and
275 * transportation costs are applied at the border and all crude oil flows




280 vcrud(i,r) Net value of crude oil demand,
281 vcrus(g,r) Net value of crude oil supply,
282 vtwrcru(j,g,r) Value of crude oil transport costs,
283 rtocru(g,r) Benchmark output tax rate on crude oil supply,
284 rtcru0(g,r) Benchmark input tax rate on crude oil,
285 rtcru(g,r) Counterfactual tax rate on crude oil,
286 phi(i,r) Distribution efficiency
287 vxcru(r) Crude exports;




292 * Value of crude supply (net export subsidy) plus any import
293 * transport margins:
294 vcrus(i,r) = vom(i,r) +sum((s,j),vtwr(j,i,s,r));
295
296 * Crude oil output tax net export subsidy:
297 rtocru(i,r)$vcrus(i,r) = (rto(i,r)*vom(i,r))/vcrus(i,r);
298
299 * Value of crude oil demand net subsidy and tariff charges:
300 vcrud(i,r) = vdm(i,r) + sum(s,vxmd(i,s,r)*(1-rtxs(i,s,r)))
301 +sum((s,j),vtwr(j,i,s,r));
302
303 * Value of transport inputs to crude imports in region r:
304 vtwrcru(j,i,r) = sum(s,vtwr(j,i,s,r));
305
306 * Benchmark tax+tariff rate on crude oil demand in region r:
307 rtcru0(i,r) = (rtda0(i,r)*vdm(i,r)+rtia0(i,r)*vim(i,r))
308 / (vcrud(i,r)+sum(j,vtwrcru(j,i,r)));
309
310 vxcru(r) = sum(s,vxmd("cru",r,s));
311
312 vdm(i,r) = 0;
313 vim(i,r) = 0;
314 esubd(i) = 0;
315 );
316











327 mc_prop(r) Assumed marginal cost as a percent of
328 international price
329 dshr_qcru(r) Quantity share of domestic output used at home
330 dshr_cru(r) Share of domestic crude consumption (GTAP value based)
331 cru_adj(g,r) Adjustment on crude inputs to g
332 cru_tadj(r) Crude trade adjust;
333
334 mc_prop(r) = 1;
335 mc_prop("SAU") = %mc_prop_sau%;
336
337 dshr_cru(r) = sum(g,vafm("cru",g,r))/vcrus("cru",r);
338 * Default is that we use gtap values to get the
339 * quantity shares.
340 dshr_qcru(r) = dshr_cru(r);
341 * Correct for SAU domestic q share is about 20%
342 * which drops the value share significantly given
343 * that domestic users purchase at marginal cost.







351 * Allocate the cru adjustment across sectors on a proportional basis
352 cru_adj(i,csc) = cru_tadj(csc)*vafm("cru",i,csc)/sum(i.local,
353 vafm("cru",i,csc));
354
355 * Remove excess value on intermediate inputs of cru and
356 * reallocate the value over to a K payment
357
358 vafm("cru",i,csc) = vafm("cru",i,csc)-cru_adj(i,csc);





364 * Specific to SAU we have complete govt ownership of K and RES
365 parameter
366 gevom(f,r) net of tax government claims on mobile factors,
367 gvfm(f,j,r) net of tax government claims on specific factors;
368
369 gevom("cap","sau") = vfm("cap","cru","sau");
370 gvfm("res","cru","sau") = vfm("res","cru","sau");
371
372 Parameter
373 trn0(r) benchmark transfer to the govt;
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381 * We corrected SAU’s consumption but now there is
382 * too much cru supplied to the internation mkt.
383 * USA consumption seems low. Let’s put the value
384 * there and correct the income balance problem through
385 * capital flows
386
387 * Increase US imports of crude
388 vcrud("cru","usa") = vcrud("cru","usa") + sum(csc,cru_tadj(csc));
389 * Increase US use of imported cru in the oil sector
390 vafm("cru","oil","usa") = vafm("cru","oil","usa") +
391 sum(csc,cru_tadj(csc));
392 * Increase US oil output
393 vom("oil","usa") = vom("oil","usa") + sum(csc,cru_tadj(csc))/(1-
394 rto("oil","usa"));




399 * Increase US armington composite
400 vafm("oil","c","usa") = vafm("oil","c","usa")+
401 sum(csc,cru_tadj(csc))*(1+rtda0("oil","usa"))/(1-rto("oil","usa"));
402 * Increase US HH consumption level to reflect in oil consumption
403 vom("c","usa") = vom("c","usa")+
404 sum(csc,cru_tadj(csc))*(1+rtda0("oil","usa"))/(1-rto("oil","usa"));






411 * Correct the capital flows
412 vb("usa") = vb("usa") + sum(csc,cru_tadj(csc));











424 ttax(r) countries with tradable carbon










434 Y(g,r)$vom(g,r) ! Supply
435 A(i,r)$(sum(g,vafm(i,g,r))) ! Armington
436 M(i,r)$vim(i,r) ! Imports
437 YT(j)$vtw(j) ! Trade services
438 MCCRU(g,r)$cru(g,r) ! Marginal Cost Activity for CRU
439 CEMIT(fe,r)$co2acct ! Carbon emission accounting
440
441 $COMMODITIES:
442 P(g,r)$(vom(g,r) and not cru(g,r)) ! Domestic output price
443 PCRU ! World market crude price
444 PMC(r) ! Marginal cost of cru production
445 PZ(r)$(1-mc_prop(r)) ! Price of tickets to export
446 PA(i,r)$(sum(g,vafm(i,g,r))) ! Armington aggregation
447 PM(j,r)$vim(j,r) ! Import price
448 PT(j)$vtw(j) ! Transportation services
449 PF(f,r)$evom(f,r) ! Primary factors rent
450 PS(g,r)$vfm("res",g,r) ! Sector-specific primary factors
451 PCARB(r)$co2acct ! Carbon accounting market
452 PTCARB$card(ttax) ! Price of tradable CO2




457 hh(r) ! household
458 govt(r) ! government
459
460 $auxiliary:
461 trn(r) ! endogenous transfer to keep real public spending
462 fixed
463 cap_adj$globaltarget !rationing of carbon to hit a specific
464 global target




469 $PROD:Y(g,r)$con(g,r) s:esub(g,r) e:(esubemult*esubecons) c:esubn(g,r)
470 + gc(e):2+oil(e):0 gas(gc):0 col(gc):0 cru(e):0
471 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
472 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i)
473 + c:$(not e(i))
474 + e:$(e(i) and not fe(i))










484 v:vafm_(i,g,r)$vafm(i,g,r) i:PA(i,r) prod:Y(g,r)
485
486 $REPORT:
487 v:vom_(g,r)$vom(g,r) o:P(g,r) prod:Y(g,r)
488
489 * Other sectors (EIS, Y, government and investment):
490 * other than consumption, oil, crude, electricity, coal and gas
491
492 $PROD:Y(g,r)$oth(g,r) s:0 res:0 klem:0 m(klem):0 kle(klem):0.5
493 + va(kle):1 e(kle):0.5 ffe(e):0.1 gc(ffe):2
494 + oil(ffe):0 gas(gc):0 col(gc):0 cru(ffe):0
495 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
496 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i)
497 + m:$(not e(i))
498 + e:$(e(i) and not fe(i))
499 i:pcarb(r)#(fe) q:(bmkco2(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
500 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfm(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) a:govt(r)
501 + t:rtf(mf,g,r) va:
502 i:PS(g,r) q:vfm("res",g,r) p:(1+rtf0("res",g,r)) a:govt(r)
503 + t:rtf("res",g,r) va:
504 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfmres(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) a:govt(r)
505 + t:rtf(mf,g,r) va:
506
507 * Electricity generation:
508
509 $PROD:Y(g,r)$ele(g,r) s:esub(g,r) e:(esubemult*0.5) gc(e):2 klm:0
510 +m(klm):esubn(g,r)
511 + va(klm):esubkl(g,r) oil(e):0 cru(e):0 gas(gc):0 col(gc):0
512 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
513 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i) m:$(not e(i))
514 + e:$(e(i) and not fe(i))
515 i:pcarb(r)#(fe) q:(bmkco2(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
516 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfm(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va:
517 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
518
519 * Oil refining:
520
521 $PROD:Y(g,r)$oil(g,r) s:0 e:0 gc(e):2 klm:0 m(klm):esubn(g,r)
522 + va(klm):esubkl(g,r) oil(e):0 cru(e):0 gas(gc):0 col(gc):0
523 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
524 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i) m:$(not e(i))
525 + e:$(e(i) and not fe(i))
526 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfm(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va:
527 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
528 i:pcarb(r)#(fe) q:(bmkco2(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
529




534 i:PZ(r)$(1-mc_prop(r)) q:(vcrus("cru",r)* (1-mc_prop(r)))





539 * Crude Marginal Cost Activity
540 $PROD:MCCRU(g,r)$cru(g,r) s:esub(g,r) e:0 gc(e):2 klm:0 m(klm):esubn(g,r)
541 + va(klm):esubkl(g,r) res:0 oil(e):0 cru(e):0
542 + gas(gc):0 col(gc):0
543 o:PMC(r) q: vcrus(g,r) a:govt(r)
544 + t:(rtocru(g,r)-rtex0(g,r))
545 * o:PS(g,r) q:(vcrus(g,r)*(1-mc_prop(r)))
546 + a:govt(r) t:rtocru(g,r)
547 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i) m:$(not e(i))
548 + e:$(e(i) and not fe(i))
549 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfm(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r))
550 + va: a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
551 i:PS(g,r) q:vfm("res",g,r) p:(1+rtf0("res",g,r))
552 + a:govt(r) t:rtf("res",g,r) res:
553 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfmres(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r))
554 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r) res:
555 i:PT(j) q:vtwrcru(j,g,r) p:(1+rtcru0(g,r))
556 + a:govt(r) t:rtcru(g,r)
557 i:pcarb(r)#(fe) q:(bmkco2(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
558
559 * Gas supply:
560
561 $PROD:Y(g,r)$gas(g,r) s:esub(g,r) e:0 gc(e):2 klm:0 m(klm):esubn(g,r)
562 + va(klm):esubkl(g,r) res:0 oil(e):0 cru(e):0
563 + gas(gc):0 col(gc):0
564 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
565 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i) m:$(not e(i))
566 + e:$(e(i) and not fe(i))
567 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfm(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va:
568 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
569 i:PS(g,r) q:vfm("res",g,r) p:(1+rtf0("res",g,r))
570 + a:govt(r) t:rtf("res",g,r) res:
571 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfmres(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r))
572 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r) res:
573 i:pcarb(r)#(fe) q:(bmkco2(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
574
575 * Coal supply:
576
577 $PROD:Y(g,r)$col(g,r) s:esub(g,r) e:0 gc(e):2 klm:0 m(klm):esubn(g,r)
578 + va(klm):esubkl(g,r) res:0 oil(e):0 cru(e):0
579 + gas(gc):0 col(gc):0
580 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
581 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i) m:$(not e(i))
582 + e:$(e(i) and not fe(i))
583 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfm(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r))
584 + va: a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
585 i:PS(g,r) q:vfm("res",g,r) p:(1+rtf0("res",g,r))
586 + a:govt(r) t:rtf("res",g,r) res:
587 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfmres(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r))
588 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r) res:
589 i:pcarb(r)#(fe) q:(bmkco2(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
91
590
591 * Armington composites:
592
593 $PROD:A(i,r)$(sum(g,vafm(i,g,r)) and not cru(i,r)) s:esubd(i)
594 o:PA(i,r) q:(sum(g, vafm(i,g,r)))
595 i:P(i,r) q:(sum(g,vdfm(i,g,r))) p:(1+rtda0(i,r))
596 + a:govt(r) t:rtda(i,r)
597 i:PM(i,r) q:(sum(g,vifm(i,g,r))) p:(1+rtia0(i,r))
598 + a:govt(r) t:rtia(i,r)
599
600 $PROD:A(i,r)$(sum(g,vafm(i,g,r)) and cru(i,r) and not csc(r))
601 o:PA(i,r) q:(sum(g,vafm(i,g,r)))
602 * rtcru(i,r) are all zero (imposed at filter in data build)
603 i:PCRU q:vcrud(i,r) p:(1+rtcru0(i,r))
604 + A:govt(r) t:rtcru(i,r)
605
606 * Crude domestic supply for csc regions
607
608 $PROD:A(i,csc)$(sum(g,vafm(i,g,csc)) and cru(i,csc) and csc(csc))
609 o:PA("cru",csc) q:(( dshr_qcru(csc))*vcrus("cru",csc)
610 + *mc_prop(csc))
611 i:PMC(csc) q:(( dshr_qcru(csc))*vcrus("cru",csc))
612
613 $REPORT:
614 v:vdfm_(i,g,r)$vdfm(i,g,r) i:P(i,r) prod:A(i,g,r)
615 v:vifm_(i,g,r)$vifm(i,g,r) i:PM(i,r) prod:A(i,g,r)








624 V:R_vst(j,r)$vst(j,r) i:P(j,r) prod:YT(j)
625
626 $PROD:M(i,r)$(vim(i,r) and not cru(i,r)) s:esubm(i) s.tl:0
627 o:PM(i,r) q:vim(i,r)
628 i:P(i,s) q:vxmd(i,s,r) p:pvxmd(i,s,r) s.tl:
629 + a:govt(s) t:(-rtxs(i,s,r)) a:govt(r)
630 + t:(rtms(i,s,r)*(1-rtxs(i,s,r)))
631 i:PT(j)#(s) q:vtwr(j,i,s,r) p:pvtwr(i,s,r) s.tl:
632 + a:govt(r) t:rtms(i,s,r)
633
634 $REPORT:















649 e:P("c",r) q:(-trn0(r)) r:trn(r)














664 + (1-mc_prop(r))) r:MKUP_ADJ(r)
665
666 $constraint:mkup_adj(r)$(1-mc_prop(r))
667 (1+rtex("cru",r))*PMC(r)-PCRU =e= 0;
668
669 $constraint:cap_adj$globaltarget
670 globaltarget =e= sum((fe,r), CEMIT(fe,r));
671
672 $constraint:trn(r)




677 $sysinclude mpsgeset gtap8
678
679 trn.l(r) = 1;
680 trn.lo(r) = -inf;
681
682 PMC.l(r) = mc_prop(r);
683 rtex("cru",csc) = ((1-mc_prop(csc))/(mc_prop(csc)));
684 rtex0(g,r) = rtex(g,r);
685 rtocru("cru",csc) = rtocru("cru",csc)/mc_prop(csc);




690 gtap8.iterlim = 0;
691 $include gtap8.gen
692 option solvelink=2;
693 SOLVE gtap8 using mcp;
694 Abort$(gtap8.objval ge 1e-3) "Benchmarking fails";
695
696 * Clean up solve to resolve data imbalance
697
93
698 gtap8.iterlim = 10000;
699 $include gtap8.gen
700 option solvelink=2;




705 * Add the carbon accounting
706
707 bmkco2(fe,g,r)$vafm(fe,g,r) = eco2(fe,g,r)/1000;
708 co2lim(fe,r) = sum(g,bmkco2(fe,g,r));
709 co2acct = yes;
710 CEMIT.L(fe,r) = co2lim(fe,r);
711 PCARBE.L(fe,r) = 0;
712
713 PCARB.L(r) = 1e-6;
714
715 * Pick a numeraire
716 p.fx("c","usa") = 1;
717
718 * Recheck the balance
719 gtap8.iterlim = 0;
720 $include gtap8.gen
721 option solvelink=2;
722 SOLVE gtap8 using mcp;





728 execute_unload "domestic.gdx" dom_cons;
729











741 parameter pltrpt1(iterr_m,iterr,*) Post policy welfare change in each
742 region (percent)
743 pltrpt2(iterr,*) Pre policy welfare change in each region
744 (percent)
745 pltrpt3(iterr,*) Regional demand for CRU (quantity) - pre policy
746 pltrpt7(iterr,*) Regional demand for CRU (quantity) - post
747 policy
748 pltrpt4(iterr,*) Total world demand for CRU (quantity) - post
749 policy
750 pltrpt5(iterr,*) Saudi export tax on crude
751 pltrpt6(iterr,*) Total world demand for CRU (quantity) - pre
94
752 policy
753 pltrpt8(iterr,*) Pre policy welfare change in Annex I oil
754 importers
755 pltrpt9(iterr,*) Pre policy welfare change in Annex I oil
756 exporters
757 pltrpt10(iterr,*) Pre policy welfare change in OPEC
758 pltrpt11(iterr,*) Post policy welfare change in Annex I oil
759 importers
760 pltrpt12(iterr,*) Post policy welfare change in Annex I oil
761 exporters
762 pltrpt13(iterr,*) Post policy welfare change in OPEC
763 pltrpt14(iterr,*,*) Pre policy emissions by region
764 pltrpt15(iterr,*,*) Post policy emissions by region
765 pltrpt16(iterr,*) Post policy price of consumption
766 pltrpt17(iterr) Post policy crude price
767 pltrpt18(iterr) SAU cru marginal cost
768 pltrpt19(iterr,*) Post policy welfare change globally
769 pltrpt20(iterr,*) Post policy regional crude supply















785 * Plot the welfare impacts of SA to ensure we
786 * have an optimal benchmark policy (adjusting
787 * the fringe supply elasticities)
788
789 loop(iterr,
790 gtap8.iterlim = 10000;
791 $include gtap8.gen
792 option solvelink=2;
793 solve gtap8 using mcp;
794
795 pltrpt2(iterr,"SAU")= Y.l("c","SAU")-bmk("SAU");
796 * pltrpt2(iterr,r)= Y.l("c",r)-bmk(r);
797 pltrpt3(iterr,r) = A.l("cru",r)*vcrud("cru",r)$
798 (not csc(r)) + A.l("cru",r)*dshr_qcru(r)*vcrus("cru",r)$(csc(r));
799 pltrpt6(iterr,"world crude demand - pre policy")=
800 sum(r,A.l("cru",r)*
801 vcrud("cru",r)$(not csc(r) +
802 A.l("cru",r)*dshr_qcru(r)*vcrus("cru",r)$(csc(r)));





807 pltrpt9(iterr,"AXI oil exporters welf change")= (sum(r(p.l("c",r)*
808 y.l("c",r)*vdm("c",r))$(axioe(r))))/(p.l("c","usa")*
809 sum(r,(vdm("c",r))$(axioe(r))))-1;














824 * Track the pre enviro policy crude supply at benchmark export tax
825
826 gtap8.iterlim = 10000;
827 $include gtap8.gen
828 option solvelink=2;













842 * Add the consumption tax on crude in Annex-I
843
844 *rtcru("cru",AXI(r)) = 0.2;
845
846
847 * Add the OECD enviro tax on CRU
848
849 co2lim(fe,r) =2*co2lim(fe,r);























872 leakage("scn_dn",fe,"chk") = sum(r,leakage("scn_dn",fe,r));




877 deltaemiss("scn_dn",r) = (sum(fe,cemit_l("scn_dn",fe,r)) -
878 sum(fe,cemit_l("bmk",fe,r)))/sum(fe,cemit_l("bmk",fe,r));
879
880 display cemit.l, leakage;
881
882 rtex("CRU","sau") = 10.3;
883 $include gtap8.gen












896 deltaemiss("scn_opt",r) = (sum(fe,cemit_l("scn_opt",fe,r)) -
897 sum(fe,cemit_l("bmk",fe,r)))/sum(fe,cemit_l("bmk",fe,r));
898






905 rtex("CRU","sau") = %strtex%;
906
907 * Reset the SA export tax
908
909 gtap8.iterlim = 10000;
910 $include gtap8.gen
911 option solvelink=2;




915 gtap8.iterlim = 10000;
916 $include gtap8.gen
917 option solvelink=2;
918 solve gtap8 using mcp;
919 pltrpt1(iterr_m,iterr,r)=Y.l("c",r)-bmk(r);
920 maxwelf("sau")$(pltrpt1(iterr_m,iterr,"sau") gt maxwelf("sau"))
921 = pltrpt1(iterr_m,iterr,"sau");





927 vcrud("cru",r)$(not csc(r))+ A.l("cru",r)*dshr_qcru(r)*
928 vcrus("cru",r)$(csc(r));
929 pltrpt5(iterr,"sau extra markup above benchmark markup")=
930 rtex("cru","sau");















946 pltrpt19(iterr,"Global welf change")= (sum(r(p.l("c",r)*y.l("c",r)*
947 vdm("c",r))$(world(r))))/(p.l("c","usa")*
948 sum(r,(vdm("c",r)$(world(r)))))-1;
949 pltrpt20(iterr,r) = MCCRU.l("CRU",r)*vcrus("CRU",r);
950









960 pltrpt19,pltrpt20, pltrpt21, leakage, welf, deltaemiss;
961
98
APPENDIX E - GAMS MODEL FOR ESSAY 3
1 $Title Alternative Conjecture of Saudi Arabias Behavior
2
3 * Khalid Aljihrish, Colorado School of Mines
4 * GAMS Code for Essay 3 of Doctoral Dissertation
5 * April, 2015
6
7 $if not set ds $set ds ch3_001
8 $include gtap8data
9
10 * number of iterations in policy loop
11 $if not set itr $set itr 10
12 * starting value of SAU rtex in policy loop (5=500% markup over mc)
13 $if not set strtex $set strtex 8.5
14 * addition to SAU rtex in policy loop
15 $if not set addrtex $set addrtex 0.1
16
17 $if not set gtgt $set gtgt yes
18
19 $if not set etaen_ns $set etaen_ns 0
20 $if not set etaen_sau $set etaen_sau 15
21 $if not set mc_prop_sau $set mc_prop_sau 0.1
22 $if not set esub $set esub 0.1




27 set sau(r) Saudi subset /SAU/
28 AXI(r) All Annex-I /AXI,USA/






35 esub(g,r) Top-level elasticity (energy versus non-energy),
36 esubn(g,r) Top-level elasticity (among non-energy goods),
37 esubkl(g,r) Capital-labor elasticity within Each Sector
38 ;
39
40 *Adjust elasticies since GTAP elasticities are too high
41 esub(g,r) = %esub%;
42 esubn("C",r) = 1;
43 esubkl(g,r) = esubva(g);
44 esubkl("ele",r) = 0.5;
45
46 parameter
47 pubs(r) public spending;
48
49 pubs(r) = sum(j, vom(j,r)*rto(j,r))
99
50 +sum(g, sum(i, vdfm(i,g,r)*rtfd(i,g,r) +
51 vifm(i,g,r)*rtfi(i,g,r)))
52 +sum(g, sum(f, vfm(f,g,r)*rtf(f,g,r)))
53 +sum((i,s), rtms(i,s,r) * (vxmd(i,s,r) * (1-rtxs(i,s,r)) +
54 sum(j,vtwr(j,i,s,r))))
















71 *esubva = elasticity of substitution of labor and capital
72
73 elast(i,"esubkl") = esubva(i);
74
75 *esubm = elasticity of substitution between imports
76
77 elast(i,"esubm") = esubm(i);
78
79 *esubd = elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported products
80









90 set fe(i) Fossil fuels /col, oil, gas, cru/,
91 en(g) Energy goods (including crude) /cru,col,oil,gas/,
92
93 *this is for nesting to allow for substitution
94
95 e(i) Energy inputs /oil,ele,cru,col,gas/,
96
97 *those have a resource input
98
99 xe(i) Exhaustible energy /col,cru,gas/,
100 yy(g,r) Sectors in the model
101 con(g,r) Consumption
102 gov(g,r) Government Consumption
103 cru(g,r) Crude oil sector
100
104 oil(g,r) Oil refining sector
105 col(g,r) Coal extraction and distribution sector
106 gas(g,r) Gas extraction and distribution sector
107 ele(g,r) Electricity
108 oth(g,r) Other sectors;
109
110 Parameter
111 vafm(i,g,r) Armington intermediate demand;
112 vafm(i,g,r) = vdfm(i,g,r)*(1+rtfd(i,g,r)) +
113 vifm(i,g,r)*(1+rtfi(i,g,r));
114
115 *the following is to clear any small flows
116 *if the 5 decimal places rounded value of vafm = 0 than set it to 0
117 vafm(i,g,r)$(round(vafm(i,g,r),5)=0) = 0;
118 *Clean (set to 0) the domestic and imports I-O in the total vafm is 0
119 vdfm(i,g,r)$(vafm(i,g,r)=0) = 0;




124 oilconsrpt("dtax_rate") = rtfd("OIL","C","SAU");
125 oilconsrpt("ftax_rate") = rtfi("OIL","C","SAU");
126 oilconsrpt("vdfm_vifm") = vdfm("OIL","C","SAU");
127 oilconsrpt("vifm_vifm") = vifm("OIL","C","SAU");






134 * Set up logical arrays which drive the MPSGE production blocks:
135
136 yy(g,r) = yes$(vom(g,r)>0);
137 oil("oil",r) = yes$vom("oil",r);
138 cru("cru",r) = yes$vom("cru",r);
139 ele("ele",r) = yes$vom("ele",r);
140 col("col",r) = yes$vom("col",r);
141 gas("gas",r) = yes$vom("gas",r);
142 gov("g",r) = yes$vom("g",r);
143 con("c",r) = yes;






150 bmkco2(fe,g,r) Benchmark carbon emissions;
151
152 bmkco2(fe,g,r) = 0;
153
154 parameter




158 * Treat resources as a specific factor:
159 * Aggregate factor endowmwnent at market price
160
161 evom("res",r) = 0;
162
163 Parameter
164 etaen(g,r) Elasticity of supply;
165 etaen("col",r) = 1;
166 etaen("gas",r) = 0.25;
167
168 etaen("cru",r) = %etaen_ns%;









178 esubemult multiplier on esube;
179 esubemult = %esubemult%;
180
181 Parameter
182 esubecons elasticity of substitution between energy types in cons;




187 rvshare(f,r,g) Resource value share;
188 * the value is gross of tax
189 rvshare("res",r,en(i))$vom(i,r) = vfm("res",i,r)*
190 (1+rtf0("res",i,r))/vom(i,r);






197 esubfe(r,g) Elasticity of substitution in fossil energy;
198 esubfe(r,g)$(1-rvshare("res",r,g)) = rvshare("res",r,g)/








207 * Elasticity of substitution on GTAP for armington in GTAP is high,
208 * so we put upper contraints on it - we pull the min elasticity
209 * of substitution between the imports and composit
210
211 esubm(i) = min(esubm(i),10);
102






218 co2acct Carbon emissions accounting /0/;
219
220 Parameter
221 vfmres(f,g,r) Resource-specific factor use
222 vfmshr(g,r) Resource value share;
223
224 vfmshr(g,r)$vfm("res",g,r) = 0.0*vfm("res",g,r)*
225 (1+rtf0("res",g,r)) /sum(mf,vfm(mf,g,r)*(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)));
226
227 vfmres(mf,g,r) = vfmshr(g,r)*vfm(mf,g,r);
228 vfm(mf,g,r) = vfm(mf,g,r)*(1-vfmshr(g,r));
229 display vfmres,vfmshr,esubfe,esub,esubm,esubd,rvshare;
230
231 * SAM adjustment to increase gross output of OIL sector
232 * "refined oil" in Saudi
233 parameter
234 theta_OIL proportional increase in OIL output /2.7/
235 OILdif value of adjustment;
236 * first pass allocate the increase in oil value to a capital payment




241 vom(i,r) = vom(i,r) + OILdif;
242 vfm("cap",i,r) = vfm("cap",i,r)+ OILdif/
243 (1+rtf0("cap",i,r));
244 vdfm(i,"c",r) = vdfm(i,"c",r)+OILdif;
245 rtfd0(i,"c",r) = -OILdif/vdfm(i,"c",r);
246 );
247 );





253 * Aggregate taxes that are sink-activity indexed by domestic and
254 * import into
255 * a set of taxes that are not sink-activity indexed.
256 Parameter
257 rtda(i,r) Tax on domestic inputs
258 rtia(i,r) Tax on imported inputs
259 rtda0(i,r) Benchmark Tax on domestic inputs
260 rtia0(i,r) Benchmark Tax on imported inputs
261 rtex(g,r) Counterfactual export tax
262 rts(g,r) Subsidy rate;
263
264 rtda(i,r)$sum(g,vdfm(i,g,r)) = sum(g,rtfd(i,g,r)*vdfm(i,g,r))/
265 sum(g,vdfm(i,g,r));
103









275 rtex0(g,r) = rtex(g,r);
276
277 * We convert bilateral crude oil flows into a global market for
278 * crude oil which is treated as a homogeneous commodity. This
279 * involves accounting for tariffs, export taxes and transport costs
280 * in a systematic manner.
281 * The resulting model is otherwise identical to the Armington model
282 * except that export subsidies, import tariffs and transportation
283 * costs are applied at the border and all crude oil flows through an
284 * integrated global market in which the law of one price applies:
285
286 parameter
287 vcrud(i,r) Net value of crude oil demand,
288 vcrus(g,r) Net value of crude oil supply,
289 vtwrcru(j,g,r) Value of crude oil transport costs,
290 rtocru(g,r) Benchmark output tax rate on crude oil supply,
291 rtcru0(g,r) Benchmark input tax rate on crude oil,
292 rtcru(g,r) Counterfactual tax rate on crude oil,
293 phi(i,r) Distribution efficiency
294 vxcru(r) Crude exports;




299 * Value of crude supply (net export subsidy) plus any import
300 * transport margins:
301 vcrus(i,r) = vom(i,r) +sum((s,j),vtwr(j,i,s,r));
302
303 * Crude oil output tax net export subsidy:
304 rtocru(i,r)$vcrus(i,r) = (rto(i,r)*vom(i,r))/vcrus(i,r);
305
306 * Value of crude oil demand net subsidy and tariff charges:
307 vcrud(i,r) = vdm(i,r) + sum(s,vxmd(i,s,r)*(1-rtxs(i,s,r))) +
308 sum((s,j),vtwr(j,i,s,r));
309
310 * Value of transport inputs to crude imports in region r:
311 vtwrcru(j,i,r) = sum(s,vtwr(j,i,s,r));
312
313 * Benchmark tax+tariff rate on crude oil demand in region r:
314 rtcru0(i,r) = (rtda0(i,r)*vdm(i,r)+rtia0(i,r)*vim(i,r))
315 / (vcrud(i,r)+sum(j,vtwrcru(j,i,r)));
316
317 vxcru(r) = sum(s,vxmd("cru",r,s));
318
319 vdm(i,r) = 0;
104
320 vim(i,r) = 0;
321 esubd(i) = 0;
322 );
323






330 Set csc(r) crude supplying countries /SAU/;
331
332 Parameter
333 mc_prop(r) Assumed marginal cost as a percent of
334 international price
335 dshr_qcru(r) Quantity share of domestic output used at home
336 dshr_cru(r) Share of domestic crude consumption (GTAP value
337 based)
338 cru_adj(g,r) Adjustment on crude inputs to g
339 cru_tadj(r) Crude trade adjust;
340
341 mc_prop(r) = 1;
342 mc_prop("SAU") = %mc_prop_sau%;
343
344 dshr_cru(r) = sum(g,vafm("cru",g,r))/vcrus("cru",r);
345 * Default is that we use gtap values to get the
346 * quantity shares.
347 dshr_qcru(r) = dshr_cru(r);
348 * Correct for SAU domestic q share is about 20%
349 * which drops the value share significantly given
350 * that domestic users purchase at marginal cost.








359 * Allocate the cru adjustment across sectors on a proportional basis
360 cru_adj(i,csc) = cru_tadj(csc)*vafm("cru",i,csc)/
361 sum(i.local,vafm("cru",i,csc));
362
363 * Remove excess value on intermediate inputs of cru and
364 * reallocate the value over to a K payment
365
366 vafm("cru",i,csc) = vafm("cru",i,csc) -cru_adj(i,csc);





372 * Specific to SAU we have complete govt ownership of K and RES
373 parameter
105
374 gevom(f,r) net of tax government claims on mobile factors,
375 gvfm(f,j,r) net of tax government claims on specific factors;
376
377 gevom("cap","sau") = vfm("cap","cru","sau");
378 gvfm("res","cru","sau") = vfm("res","cru","sau");
379
380 Parameter
381 trn0(r) benchmark transfer to the govt;







389 * Ok, we corrected SAU’s consumption but now there is
390 * too much cru supplied to the internation mkt.
391 * USA consumption seems low. Let’s put the value
392 * there and correct the income balance problem through
393 * capital flows
394
395 * Increase US imports of crude
396
397 vcrud("cru","usa") = vcrud("cru","usa") +
398 sum(csc,cru_tadj(csc));
399
400 * Increase US use of imported cru in the oil sector
401
402 vafm("cru","oil","usa") = vafm("cru","oil","usa") +
403 sum(csc,cru_tadj(csc));
404
405 * Increase US oil output
406
407 vom("oil","usa") = vom("oil","usa") +
408 sum(csc,cru_tadj(csc))/(1-rto("oil","usa"));
409





415 * Increase US armington composite
416




421 * Increase US HH consumption level to reflect in oil consumption
422













435 * Correct the capital flows
436
437 vb("usa") = vb("usa") + sum(csc,cru_tadj(csc));











449 ttax(r) countries with tradable carbon










460 Y(g,r)$vom(g,r) ! Supply
461 A(i,r)$(sum(g,vafm(i,g,r))) ! Armington
462 M(i,r)$vim(i,r) ! Imports
463 YT(j)$vtw(j) ! Trade services
464 MCCRU(g,r)$cru(g,r) ! Marginal Cost Activity for CRU
465 CEMIT(fe,r)$co2acct ! Carbon emission accounting
466
467 $COMMODITIES:
468 P(g,r)$(vom(g,r) and not cru(g,r)) ! Domestic output price
469 PCRU ! World market crude price
470 PMC(r) ! Marginal cost of cru production
471 PZ(r)$(1-mc_prop(r)) ! Price of tickets to export
472 PA(i,r)$(sum(g,vafm(i,g,r))) ! Armington aggregation
473 PM(j,r)$vim(j,r) ! Import price
474 PT(j)$vtw(j) ! Transportation services
475 PF(f,r)$evom(f,r) ! Primary factors rent
476 PS(g,r)$vfm("res",g,r) ! Sector-specific primary factors
477 PCARB(r)$co2acct ! Carbon accounting market
478 PTCARB$card(ttax) ! Price of tradable CO2





483 hh(r) ! household
484 govt(r) ! government
485
486 $auxiliary:
487 trn(r) ! endogenous transfer to keep real public spending
488 fixed
489 cap_adj$globaltarget ! rationing of carbon to hit a specific
490 global target




495 $PROD:Y(g,r)$con(g,r) s:esub(g,r) e:(esubemult*esubecons) c:esubn(g,r)
496 + gc(e):2
497 + oil(e):0 gas(gc):0 col(gc):0 cru(e):0
498 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
499 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i)
500 + c:$(not e(i))
501 + e:$(e(i) and not fe(i))









511 v:vafm_(i,g,r)$vafm(i,g,r) i:PA(i,r) prod:Y(g,r)
512
513 $REPORT:




518 * Other sectors (EIS, Y, government and investment):
519 * other than consumption, oil, crude, electricity, coal and gas
520
521 $PROD:Y(g,r)$oth(g,r) s:0 res:0 klem:0 m(klem):0 kle(klem):0.5
522 + va(kle):1 e(kle):0.5 ffe(e):0.1 gc(ffe):2
523 + oil(ffe):0 gas(gc):0 col(gc):0 cru(ffe):0
524 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
525 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i)
526 + m:$(not e(i))
527 + e:$(e(i) and not fe(i))
528 i:pcarb(r)#(fe) q:(bmkco2(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
529 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfm(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) a:govt(r)
530 + t:rtf(mf,g,r) va:
531 i:PS(g,r) q:vfm("res",g,r) p:(1+rtf0("res",g,r)) a:govt(r)
532 + t:rtf("res",g,r) va:
533 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfmres(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) a:govt(r)
534 + t:rtf(mf,g,r) va:
535
108
536 * Electricity generation:
537
538 $PROD:Y(g,r)$ele(g,r) s:esub(g,r) e:(esubemult*0.5) gc(e):2 klm:0
539 + m(klm):esubn(g,r)
540 + va(klm):esubkl(g,r) oil(e):0 cru(e):0 gas(gc):0 col(gc):0
541 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
542 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i) m:$(not e(i)) e:$
543 + (e(i) and not fe(i))
544 i:pcarb(r)#(fe) q:(bmkco2(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
545 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfm(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va:
546 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
547
548 * Oil refining:
549
550 $PROD:Y(g,r)$oil(g,r) s:0 e:0 gc(e):2 klm:0 m(klm):esubn(g,r)
551 + va(klm):esubkl(g,r) oil(e):0 cru(e):0 gas(gc):0 col(gc):0
552 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
553 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i) m:$(not e(i)) e:$
554 + (e(i) and not fe(i))
555 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfm(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va:
556 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
557 i:pcarb(r)#(fe) q:(bmkco2(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
558




563 i:PZ(r)$(1-mc_prop(r)) q:(vcrus("cru",r)* (1-mc_prop(r)))




568 * Crude Marginal Cost Activity
569 $PROD:MCCRU(g,r)$cru(g,r) s:esub(g,r) e:0 gc(e):2 klm:0 m(klm):esubn(g,r)
570 + va(klm):esubkl(g,r) res:0 oil(e):0 cru(e):0 gas(gc):0 col(gc):0
571 o:PMC(r) q: vcrus(g,r) a:govt(r) t:(rtocru(g,r)-
572 + rtex0(g,r))
573 * o:PS(g,r) q:(vcrus(g,r)*(1-mc_prop(r))) a:govt(r)
574 + t:rtocru(g,r)
575 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i) m:$(not e(i)) e:$
576 + (e(i) and not fe(i))
577 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfm(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va:
578 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
579 i:PS(g,r) q:vfm("res",g,r) p:(1+rtf0("res",g,r)) a:govt(r)
580 + t:rtf("res",g,r) res:
581 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfmres(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) a:govt(r)
582 + t:rtf(mf,g,r) res:
583 i:PT(j) q:vtwrcru(j,g,r) p:(1+rtcru0(g,r)) a:govt(r)
584 + t:rtcru(g,r)
585 i:pcarb(r)#(fe) q:(bmkco2(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
586
587 * Gas supply:
588
589 $PROD:Y(g,r)$gas(g,r) s:esub(g,r) e:0 gc(e):2 klm:0 m(klm):esubn(g,r)
109
590 + va(klm):esubkl(g,r) res:0 oil(e):0 cru(e):0 gas(gc):0 col(gc):0
591 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
592 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i) m:$(not e(i)) e:$
593 + (e(i) and not fe(i))
594 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfm(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va:
595 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
596 i:PS(g,r) q:vfm("res",g,r) p:(1+rtf0("res",g,r)) a:govt(r)
597 + t:rtf("res",g,r) res:
598 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfmres(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) a:govt(r)
599 + t:rtf(mf,g,r) res:
600 i:pcarb(r)#(fe) q:(bmkco2(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
601
602 * Coal supply:
603
604 $PROD:Y(g,r)$col(g,r) s:esub(g,r) e:0 gc(e):2 klm:0 m(klm):esubn(g,r)
605 + va(klm):esubkl(g,r) res:0 oil(e):0 cru(e):0 gas(gc):0 col(gc):0
606 o:P(g,r) q:vom(g,r) a:govt(r) t:rto(g,r)
607 i:PA(i,r) q:vafm(i,g,r) i.tl:$fe(i) m:$(not e(i)) e:$
608 + (e(i) and not fe(i))
609 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfm(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) va:
610 + a:govt(r) t:rtf(mf,g,r)
611 i:PS(g,r) q:vfm("res",g,r) p:(1+rtf0("res",g,r)) a:govt(r)
612 + t:rtf("res",g,r) res:
613 i:PF(mf,r) q:vfmres(mf,g,r) p:(1+rtf0(mf,g,r)) a:govt(r)
614 + t:rtf(mf,g,r) res:
615 i:pcarb(r)#(fe) q:(bmkco2(fe,g,r)) p:1e-6 fe.tl:
616
617 * Armington composites:
618
619 $PROD:A(i,r)$(sum(g,vafm(i,g,r)) and not cru(i,r)) s:esubd(i)
620 o:PA(i,r) q:(sum(g, vafm(i,g,r)))
621 i:P(i,r) q:(sum(g,vdfm(i,g,r))) p:(1+rtda0(i,r)) a:govt(r)
622 + t:rtda(i,r)
623 i:PM(i,r) q:(sum(g,vifm(i,g,r))) p:(1+rtia0(i,r)) a:govt(r)
624 + t:rtia(i,r)
625
626 $PROD:A(i,r)$(sum(g,vafm(i,g,r)) and cru(i,r) and not csc(r))
627 o:PA(i,r) q:(sum(g,vafm(i,g,r)))
628 * rtcru(i,r) are all zero (imposed at filter in data build)
629 i:PCRU q:vcrud(i,r) p:(1+rtcru0(i,r)) A:govt(r)
630 + t:rtcru(i,r)
631 * i:PT(j) q:vtwrcru(j,i,r) p:(1+rtcru0(i,r)) A:govt(r)
632 + t:rtcru(i,r)
633 * Crude domestic supply for csc regions
634
635 $PROD:A(i,csc)$(sum(g,vafm(i,g,csc)) and cru(i,csc) and csc(csc))
636 o:PA("cru",csc) q:((
637 + dshr_qcru(csc))*vcrus("cru",csc)*mc_prop(csc))
638 i:PMC(csc) q:(( dshr_qcru(csc))*vcrus("cru",csc))
639
640 $REPORT:
641 v:vdfm_(i,g,r)$vdfm(i,g,r) i:P(i,r) prod:A(i,g,r)
642 v:vifm_(i,g,r)$vifm(i,g,r) i:PM(i,r) prod:A(i,g,r)









651 V:R_vst(j,r)$vst(j,r) i:P(j,r) prod:YT(j)
652
653 $PROD:M(i,r)$(vim(i,r) and not cru(i,r)) s:esubm(i) s.tl:0
654 o:PM(i,r) q:vim(i,r)
655 i:P(i,s) q:vxmd(i,s,r) p:pvxmd(i,s,r) s.tl:
656 + a:govt(s) t:(-rtxs(i,s,r)) a:govt(r) t:(rtms(i,s,r)*(1-
657 + rtxs(i,s,r)))
658 i:PT(j)#(s) q:vtwr(j,i,s,r) p:pvtwr(i,s,r) s.tl:
659 + a:govt(r) t:rtms(i,s,r)
660
661 $REPORT:














676 e:P("c",r) q:(-trn0(r)) r:trn(r)














691 + (1-mc_prop(r))) r:MKUP_ADJ(r)
692
693 $constraint:mkup_adj(r)$(1-mc_prop(r))
694 (1+rtex("cru",r))*PMC(r)-PCRU =e= 0;
695
696 $constraint:cap_adj$globaltarget








704 $sysinclude mpsgeset gtap8
705
706 trn.l(r) = 1;
707 trn.lo(r) = -inf;
708
709 PMC.l(r) = mc_prop(r);
710 rtex("cru",csc) = ((1-mc_prop(csc))/(mc_prop(csc)));
711 rtex0(g,r) = rtex(g,r);
712 rtocru("cru",csc) = rtocru("cru",csc)/mc_prop(csc);




717 gtap8.iterlim = 0;
718 $include gtap8.gen
719 option solvelink=2;
720 SOLVE gtap8 using mcp;
721 Abort$(gtap8.objval ge 1e-3) "Benchmarking fails";
722
723 * Clean up solve to resolve data imbalance
724
725 gtap8.iterlim = 10000;
726 $include gtap8.gen
727 option solvelink=2;




732 * Add the carbon accounting
733
734 bmkco2(fe,g,r)$vafm(fe,g,r) = eco2(fe,g,r)/1000;
735 co2lim(fe,r) = sum(g,bmkco2(fe,g,r));
736 co2acct = yes;
737 CEMIT.L(fe,r) = co2lim(fe,r);
738 PCARBE.L(fe,r) = 0;
739
740 PCARB.L(r) = 1e-6;
741
742 * Pick a numeraire
743 p.fx("c","usa") = 1;
744
745 * Recheck the balance
746
747 gtap8.iterlim = 0;
748 $include gtap8.gen
749 option solvelink=2;
750 SOLVE gtap8 using mcp;
751 abort$(gtap8.objval gt 1e-3) "benchmark with carbon is not balanced";
112
752
753 parameter saucons, axicons;
754
755 saucons = sum(i,vafm(i,"c","sau"));
756 axicons(r) = sum(i,vafm(i,"c",r));
757





763 execute_unload "domestic.gdx" dom_cons;
764











776 parameter pltrpt1(iterr_m,iterr,*) Post policy welfare change in each
777 region (percent)
778 pltrpt2(iterr,*) Pre policy welfare change in each region
779 (percent)
780 pltrpt3(iterr,*) Regional demand for CRU (quantity) - pre policy
781 pltrpt7(iterr_m,iterr,*) Regional demand for CRU (quantity) -
782 post policy
783 pltrpt4(iterr_m,iterr,*) Total world demand for CRU (quantity) -
784 post policy
785 pltrpt5(iterr,*) Saudi export tax on crude
786 pltrpt6(iterr,*) Total world demand for CRU (quantity) - pre
787 policy
788 pltrpt8(iterr,*) Pre policy welfare change in Annex I oil
789 importers
790 pltrpt9(iterr,*) Pre policy welfare change in Annex I oil
791 exporters
792 pltrpt10(iterr,*) Pre policy welfare change in OPEC
793 pltrpt11(iterr_m,iterr,*) Post policy welfare change in Annex I
794 oil importers
795 pltrpt12(iterr_m,iterr,*) Post policy welfare change in Annex I
796 oil exporters
797 pltrpt13(iterr_m,iterr,*) Post policy welfare change in OPEC
798 pltrpt14(iterr,*,*) Pre policy emissions by region
799 pltrpt15(iterr_m,iterr,*,*) Post policy emissions by region
800 pltrpt16(iterr_m,iterr,*) Post policy price of consumption
801 pltrpt17(iterr_m,iterr) Post policy crude price
802 pltrpt18(iterr_m,iterr) SAU cru marginal cost
803 pltrpt19(iterr_m,iterr,*) Post policy welfare change globally
804 pltrpt20(iterr_m,iterr,*) Post policy regional crude supply
805 pltrpt21(iterr_m,*) Optimal Saudi Reaction
113















821 * Plot the welfare impacts of SA to ensure we
822 * have an optimal benchmark policy (adjusting
823 * the fringe supply elasticities)
824 *$ontext
825 loop(iterr,
826 gtap8.iterlim = 10000;
827 $include gtap8.gen
828 option solvelink=2;
829 solve gtap8 using mcp;
830
831 pltrpt2(iterr,"SAU")= Y.l("c","SAU")-bmk("SAU");
832 pltrpt3(iterr,r)= A.l("cru",r)*vcrud("cru",r)$(not csc(r))+
833 A.l("cru",r)*dshr_qcru(r)*vcrus("cru",r)$(csc(r));
















850 * Track the pre enviro policy crude supply at benchmark export tax
851 gtap8.iterlim = 10000;
852 $include gtap8.gen
853 option solvelink=2;














867 * Add the enviro cap on emissions
868
869 co2lim(fe,r) =2*co2lim(fe,r);




















890 leakage("scn_dn",fe,"chk") = sum(r,leakage("scn_dn",fe,r));






897 deltaemiss("scn_dn",r) = (sum(fe,cemit_l("scn_dn",fe,r)) -
898 sum(fe,cemit_l("bmk",fe,r)))/sum(fe,cemit_l("bmk",fe,r));
899
900 display cemit.l, leakage;
901
902 rtex("CRU","sau") = 11.8;
903 rtms(i,"sau",axi) = rtms(i,"Sau",axi)+0.55;
904 $include gtap8.gen
















920 deltaemiss("scn_opt",r) = (sum(fe,cemit_l("scn_opt",fe,r)) -
921 sum(fe,cemit_l("bmk",fe,r)))/sum(fe,cemit_l("bmk",fe,r));
922






929 rtex("CRU","sau") = %strtex%;
930 rtms(i,r,s)=rtms0(i,r,s);
931




936 rtex("CRU","sau") = %strtex%;
937 gtap8.iterlim = 10000;
938 $include gtap8.gen
939 option solvelink=2;
940 solve gtap8 using mcp;
941
942 maxwelf("Sau") = -inf;
943 loop(iterr,
944 gtap8.iterlim = 10000;
945 $include gtap8.gen
946 option solvelink=2;
947 solve gtap8 using mcp;
948 pltrpt1(iterr_m,iterr,r)=Y.l("c",r)-bmk(r);
949 maxwelf("sau")$(pltrpt1(iterr_m,iterr,"sau") gt maxwelf("sau"))=
950 pltrpt1(iterr_m,iterr,"sau");
951 pltrpt4(iterr_m,iterr,"world crude demand - post policy")=
952 sum(r,A.l("cru",r)*
953 vcrud("cru",r)$(not csc(r))+ A.l("cru",r)*dshr_qcru(r)*vcrus("cru",r)$
954 (csc(r)));
955 pltrpt7(iterr_m,iterr,r) = A.l("cru",r)*vcrud("cru",r)$
956 (not csc(r))+ A.l("cru",r)*dshr_qcru(r)*vcrus("cru",r)$(csc(r));
957 pltrpt5(iterr,"sau extra markup above benchmark markup")=
958 rtex("cru","sau");











969 pltrpt20(iterr_m,iterr,r) = MCCRU.l("CRU",r)*vcrus("CRU",r);
970





976 pltrpt21(iterr_m,"Saudi Optimal Reaction")= maxwelf("sau");







984 pltrpt16,pltrpt17, pltrpt18, pltrpt19, pltrpt20, pltrpt21, pltrpt22,
985 leakage,
986 welf, deltaemiss;
117
